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DEVELOP!v1ENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
I .  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
1.  German  reactions  to  the  results of  the Luxembourg 
conferences 
On  17-18 January  1966  an extraordinary meeting  of the 
Council  of Ministers was  held in Luxembourg with  a  view 
to  settling the  EEC  crisis precipitated by  the  French 
Government  on  30  June  1965,  and  bringing France  back  to 
the  conference  table in Brussels.  The  major issues were 
the  implementation of majority decisions,  as  provided for 
in the  EEC  Treaty of  1 January  1966,  and  the restriction 
of  the  Commission's  powers  of initiative. 
The  first  conference  brought little change  in the  crlSlS 
of the  European Economic  Community.  The  radical diver-
gence  of  opinion separating France  and  the  Five  remained, 
although  the  viewpoints  of the  two  sides  on  subsidiary 
questions were  brought  a  little closer.  The  only tangible 
result was  the  decision to  call a  new  conference  for  28 
and  29  January. 
At  the  first meeting,  France insisted on  the  maintenance 
of the  right  of veto in the  Council  of Ministers  and  on 
the  restriction of the  powers  of initiative of the  EEC 
Commission.  In a  timetable  presented  to  the  conference 
France  called for  a  decision by  the  end  of January  on  the 
right  of veto  and  on proposals,  contained in a  ten-point 
memorandum,  for revising the  relations between the  Council 
and  the  Commission. 
After the first extraordinary meeting of the  Council  of 
Ministers  of the  European Community,  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  expressed its concern- through its spokesman, 
Secretary-of-State von Hase  - about  the  outcome  of the 
Luxembourg  conference.  It looked  to  the  Five  to  secure 
the full co-operation of their remaining partner.  The 
Federal  Government  felt  that  the  new  talks in Luxembourg 
should be  restricted to .the  two  major issues:  majority 
decisions  and  co-operation between the  Council  of Minis-
- 1  -ters and  the  Commission.  All  other points,  such  as  the 
question of individual  appointments,  timetables  and  rati-
fication of the  Treaty relating to  the  merger,  could  be 
discussed  once  France  had  resumed  collaboration in Brus-
sels.  Asked whether  Bonn  had  expected better results in 
Luxembourg,  Mr.  von Hase  stated that  the  Federal  Govern-
ment's  attitude  to  the  negotiations  had  been fairly 
realistic;  nevertheless,  better results could  certainly 
have  been  achieved.  It would  now  be  necessary,  of  course, 
to  consider all the  developments  to  which  France's inflex-
ible  attitude might  give  rise. 
Speakers  of all the  political parties represented in the 
Bundestag  expressed their con'cern  about  the  outcome  of 
the  Luxembourg meeting.  Mr.  Majonica,  Chairman  of  the 
External  Policy Work  Group  of  the  CDU/CSU,  felt that  the 
French  proposals were  inconsistent with both  the  spirit 
and  the  letter of  the  EEC  Treaty  and  were  therefore 
unacceptable  in that  form.  The  fact  that negotiations 
had  not  been broken  off could,  in his  opinion,  be  regard-
ed  as  a  positive  achievement.  Although  an  acceptable 
compromise  would  not  be  easy to  reach,  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  would  do  its utmost  to  take  the  edge  of the  European 
crisis.  Faith must  however  be  kept  with  signed Treaties, 
which  no  country  could  afford  to  brush  aside.  Mr.  Starke 
(FDP)  described France's  action as  an  example  of  the 
"all-too-familiar tactics" whereby  the  remaining partners 
are  made  to  appear  jointly responsible  for  a  new  break-
down.  It was  essential  that  the  EEC  should  survive,  and 
on  no  account  should  immutable  regulations  that  favoured 
one  partner in particular be  considered.  The  SPD  Press 
and  Information Service· considered  the  decision to  hold 
another meeting in Luxembourg  as  the  only  positive result 
of the  conference.  The  French  demands,  which  partook  of 
the  nature  of an ultimatum,  led  one  to  fear  the  worst  for 
the  EEC  as  they would  deprive it of any vitality.  The 
crisis went  deeper  than many  liked to  believe;  it struck 
at  the  very roots  of the  EEC,  and  Europe  had  a  lean time 
ahead  of it. 
Dr.  Rainer Barzel,  Chairman  of the  CDU/CSU  Group,  sharply 
criticized the  French attitude at  the  EEC  conference  in 
Luxembourg.  European unity could not  be  achieved merely 
by issuing and  obeying  orders  but  must  be  based  on mutual 
trust  and  a  policy  of  compromise  and  give-and-take.  There 
were  limits  to  what  France  could  do  on its own  and  the 
Federal  Government's  policy would  riot  be  to  retire into 
a  corner  to  sulk.  Dr.  Barzel  hoped  that  at  the  next  meet-
ing at  the  end  of January  the  Member  States would  be  able 
to  settle their various  differences in a  calm  frame  of 
mind. 
- 2  -Economics Minister Schmucker,  speaking  on  German  tele-
vision on  19  January,  suggested that  the  crisis of  the 
European Economic  Community  should not  be  overburdened 
with political problems.  In his view  the  EEC  was  pursu-
ing mainly  economic  objectives  and  the  political union 
of Europe  should therefore  be  sought  at another level. 
He  was  disappointed by  the  outcome  of the first Luxem-
bourg  conference  but  hoped  that  a  rapprochement  would 
take  place in the  days  that lay ahead. 
Dr.  Franz-Josef Strauss,  Chairman of the  CSU,  was  the 
only  German  politician to  endorse  the  French attitude  to 
the  EEC  crisis.  In an interview with the  Regensburg 
"Mittelbayerische  Zeitung"  he  expressed the  view that  the 
French  should be  granted  a  right  of veto  on Community 
decisions.  "We  too  feel  that we  should not  be  outvoted 
against  our' will  ori  an  economic  - or perhaps,  one  day,  a 
political -question that  we  regard  as  of vital interest 
to us."  He  brushed  aside  the  possibility of the  Common 
Market's  carrying  on without  France.  He  also  opposed  the 
view  that  the  EEC  Commission at Brussels  could be  regard-
ed  as  the  forerunner  of  a  European  Government  since 
"sovereignty still rests decisively with the  national 
Governments".  He  rejected however  any  proposaJ  to  change 
the  text  of the  Rome  Treaty. 
Dr.  Alwin Munchmeyer,  Vice-President  of the  DIHT  (German 
Conference  of Industry  and  Commerce),  speaking in Hanover 
on  24  January,  stated that  the  position of the  EEC  Com-
mission  should  on  no  account  be  weakened.  Its right  of 
initiative in particular should be  preserved.  The  general 
view in the  DIHT  was  that -continued  attempts  should be 
made  to  reach  an understanding._  A formal  right  of veto 
for  one  country was  rejected but it should  be  possible  to 
meet  French wishes  by  special arrangements under  the  rules 
of procedure.  The  President  of  the  EEC  Banking Associa-
tion and  of the  Federal  German  Association of Private 
Banks,  Freiherr von  Falkenhausen  spoke  on  24  January  1966 
at Cologne  University in defence  of the  EEC  Commission. 
The  Commission was  striving to  act in a  European spirit 
and  to  bring into being  a  larger European motherland.  Its 
members  could  on  no  account  be  described  as  "stateless 
technocrats",  the  term applied to  them by  President  de 
Gaulle.  In the  course  of  subsequent  endeavours  to  over-
come  the  crisis,  the  concept  of the  EEC  -at least in its 
basic features  - would  at all events have  to  be  retained. 
On  27  January,  on  the  eve  of the  second  conference  of the 
Extraordinary Council  of Ministers in Luxembourg,  the 
German  Bundestag held  a  debate  on  the  crisis in the  Euro-
pean Economic  Community.  Foreign Minister Schroder 
- 3  -presented  a  detailed report  on  the  first Luxembourg  con-
ference  and  secured  the  German Parliament's full backing 
for  the  second Luxembourg  conference  (1). 
In an  interview with the  German  Press  Agency  shortly be-
fore  the  first Luxembourg  conference,  Professor Muller-
Armack  expressed  the  view  that  the  meeting of the  EEC 
Council  of Ministers  could  only  succeed if a  compromise 
was  reached  between  the  wishes  of France  and  those  of  the 
remaining five  partners.  Success  would  depend  on  agree-
ment  by  the  French  to  a  link between  the  EEC  and  EFTA, 
and  acceptance  by  the  other Member  States  of certain of 
General  de  Gaulle's  demands.  There  could  be  no  other 
solution for Europe  than bringing together  the  EEC  and 
EFTA  and  at  the  same  time  preserving the  national  organi-
zations still in existence  as  a  basis  for  a  European 
organization.  Nevertheless,  the  French  argument  for  a 
"Europe  des  patries"  pointed  to  the  indisputable histo-
rical fact  that Europe  consists  of national States. 
Professor Muller-Armack  admitted  that  the  EEC  Commission, 
in its attempt  to  arrive  at  a  political interpretation of 
the  economic  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  had  probably  gone 
too  far as it had  claimed for itself a  corresponding 
political role. 
The  most  import~Dt result  of  the  second  conference  of  the 
Council  of Ministers in Luxembourg  on  28-29 January  1966 
was  France's return to  the  conference  table in Brussels 
to  resume  work in the  European Economic  Community.  Mr. 
Majonica  (CDU/CSU),  commenting  on  the  compromise  reached 
in Luxembourg,  stated that  the  dispute  over majority 
decisions  had  been reduced  to its true  dimensions.  The 
Commission  remained  a  Community  body  enjoying equal  rights. 
Mr.  Wehner,  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  SPD,  described  the 
Luxembourg  formula  as  an  imperfect  but useful  instrument 
with which  to  extricate  the  Community  from  the  crisis. 
German  press  comments  followed  similar lines.  The  "Frank-
furter Allgemeine  Zeitung"  wrote  that while  the  EEC  was 
for  the  time  being disabled  and its very existence  threat-
ened,  it could  no  longer apparently be  actually destroyed-
this not  so  much  in  the  interests of European unity as 
because  national interests ruled  out  the  destruction of 
the  Community  and,  indeed,  demanded its continued  develop-
ment.  The  Hamburger  "Welt"  stated that  the  five  partners 
of France  had  warded  off  any  watering-down  of  the  EEC 
Treaty  and  had  secured France's promise  to  return to 
Brussels.  Failure  to  settle the  question of majurity 
(1)  See  details in the  previous  number  of this bulletin. 
- 4  -decisions had however  made  the Luxembourg  conference  only 
a  partial success. 
Foreign Minister Schroder,  in an interview with the 
11Deutsche  Welle",  stated that  the  most  important result 
of  the  second Luxembourg  conference  had  been the  return 
to  normality.  A modus  vivendi  had  been found  regarding 
majority decisions  and  no  effort would  be  spared  to  find 
solutions  as far  as  possible  acceptable  to  all EEC  part-
ners.  As  regards  the  relationship between the  Council  of 
Ministers  and  the  EEC  Commission,  the  Council  had  expres~ 
ed  certain misgivings which would  have  to  be  discussed 
with  the  Commission.  Regarding  the  outlook for political 
union  of  the  EEC  countries,  Dr.  Schroder remarked:  "We 
shall not  relax our efforts to  achieve  this aim." 
Dr.  Schroder went  on  to  stress that  German  policy was 
still aimed  at  extending the  EEC.  Efforts to  establish 
closer contacts between  the  European Economic  Community 
and  EFTA  were  continuing. 
At  a  press  conference  on  31  January  1966,  Secretary-of-
State von Rase  issued the  following  statement  on  the re-
sults of  the  second Luxembourg  conference. 
11The  Federal Parliament,  whose  attitude  towards  the 
problems  of the  EEC  has  been  so  strikingly supported  by 
the  Bundestag,  welcomes  the  fact  that  as  a  result  of  the 
conference in Luxembourg  the  joint work  of the  EEC  in 
Brussels  can  once  again be  resumed.  The  Federal  Govern-
ment  hopes  that  the  EEC  will immediately  proceed  to 
tackle  the  other problems  whose  solution is essential to 
the vital. interests of all.  These  include  questions 
connected with the  inclusion of  the  commercial  and 
industrial sectors  and with the Kennedy Round." 
In the  opinion of the  DIRT,  the  Luxembourg  conferences 
have  cleared up  only  a  fraction of  the  existing institu-
tional  and material  problems.  In a  statement  published 
on  3  February  1966,  the  DIRT  points  out  that  an increase 
in the  powers  of  the  Council  of Ministers would  only be 
acceptable if it implied  a  better political guarantee  of 
the  process  of integration.  At  all events,  the  EEC  Com-
mission must  remain  the  driving force  for future  progress. 
On  31  January the  Europa-Union published the  following 
statement  on  the  outcome  of the  second  extraordinary 
meeting of the  Council  of Ministers at Luxembourg: 
"The  Europa-Union  of  Germany  welcomes  the  outcome  of the 
Luxembourg  conference.  France will now  once  again parti-
cipate  fully in the  Community's  activities,  thanks  to  the 
- 5  -determined  and  convincing way  the  Five  conducted  the  ne-
gotiations  on  the  strength of the  inviolability of  the 
Community  Treaties. 
No  Member  State  can  allow  the  existence  of  the  Community 
to  be  imperilled.  Interests are  now  so  closely interwoven 
that  to  turn back would  involve  grave  economic  and  social 
consequences. 
Work  is going  ahead in Brussels with  a  view  to  settling 
current difficulties and  preparing the  EEC  for  a  merger 
of  the  economies. 
This  resumption of activities will enable  the  Community 
to  go  ahead with  and  succeed in the  negotiations in the 
Kermedy  Round.  In view  of  the  mounting  desire  in Great 
Britain and  other countries for  admission  to  the  Community, 
the  widening  of  the  EEC  can  once  again be  considered." 
(Bulletin of the  Press  and  Information Service  of  the 
Federal  Government,  No.  15,  2  February  1966;  Information 
Department  of  the  German  Council  of the  European Movement, 
No.  2/J,  10  February  1966;  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
19,  20,  21,  25  and  31  January  1966;  Le  Monde,  21  and  23/ 
24  January  and  1  February  1966;  Die  Welt,  21  and  22  Jan-
uary  1966;  Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung,  21,  22  and  31  January, 
1  and  2  February  1966) 
2.  Franco-German  talks 
At  the  close  of the  meeting  of  the  French Council  of 
Ministers  of  9  February,  the  Secretary-of-State for In-
formation  stated with reference  to  Franco-German talks 
held under  the  Franco-German Co-operation Treaty in Paris 
on  7  and  8  February:  "Nothing spectacular was  expected  of 
this meeting whose  purpose  was  to  define  common  objectives 
and  whose  success  was  due  to  the  practical  approach  adopt-
ed.  Mr.  Pompidou  stressed the  excellent  atmosphere  and 
the  value  of the  talks he  had  with Mr.  Erhard  and Mr. 
Westrick.  The  construction of Europe  was  the  concern 
shared  by  both delegations  who  considered  that  this was 
going  forward  slowly  and  that  something new  should  be 
undertaken to  fructify  the  efforts  concerning political 
contacts  between  the  Six.  The  machinery  for  this politi-
cal  construction was  not  defined but it was  in principle 
recognized  as  desirable  and  France  and  Germany  expressed 
their interest in that which might  bring them closer 
together." 
- 6  -The  Secretary-of-State for  Information then explained 
that  the  talks had  made  it possible  to increase  scientif-
ic  co-operation between the  two  countries  and  to  promote 
research in the  key  sectors,  and  he  added with reference 
to Europe:  "Satisfaction was  expressed at  the  results 
achieved in Luxembourg whose  importance  was  emphasized. 
It will be  necessary in Brussels  to ·tackle  the difficult 
and  complex  problems still outstanding."  (Le  Monde, 
10  February  1966) 
3.  German  comments  on  the  Franco-German talks in Paris 
European policy,  bilateral relations between  Germany  and 
France  and  the  coming visit to Moscow  of General  de  Gaul~ 
stood in the  forefront  of the  Franco-German talks held in 
Paris  on  7  and  8  February  1966. 
Before  setting off for Paris,  Federal Chancellor Erhard 
dwelt  in an interview with  "Die  Welt"  on  28  January  1966 
on  the  importance  of the  talks with General  de  Gaulle. 
Dr.  Erhard  stressed that it was  in the  nature  of regular 
meetings  that  spectacular results could not  be  expected 
on  every  occasion.  He  had  already pointed  out  before  the 
CDU/CSU  Group  that  the  EEC  crisis should not  be  reduced 
to bilateral tensions in the  Franco-German relations.  He 
expressed the  hope  that  the  situation in the  EEC  would 
become  clearer before his visit to Paris  and,  if necessa-
ry,  the  question of closer political co-operation in 
Europe  could  be  looked into,  a  matter  on which  more  de-
tails would  be  necessary. 
At  the  "Forum 66"  of  the  Youth Union  and  of the  Economic 
Council  of the  CDU  in Wiesbaden  on  4  February  1966,  Dr. 
Rainer Barzel,  speaking  on  "the  new  generation shapes  the 
future",  stated that  Franco-German friendship was irre-
placeable  for all Germans  on  the  road  to  freedom.  Dr. 
Barzel  pointed  out  that  he  could  see  "good  chances  for  a 
spell of better weather  and  even  sunny  days  between Bonn 
and  Paris."  The  French President  should be  approached 
without  provincial mistrust  and  asked  to  put  forward  the 
Federal Republic's viewpoint  on  the  German  question ducing 
his forthcoming visit  to Moscow.  After all, nothing 
would  be  better for France  than to  be  the  spokesman for 
human  rights. 
In an after-dinner  speech given during  the  Paris talks 
General  de  Gaulle  stressed France's desire  to  work  jointly 
- 7  -in practical things with  the  Federal Republic  and if 
possible  also with  the  other European partners.  Satis-
factory  co-operation  should not  be  confined  to  the  econo-
mic  sector but  also  embr_ace  the  political  sphere.  In his 
reply,  Federal Chancellor Erhard  called for  a  Franco-
German initiative in Europe.  In spite  of many  difficul-
ties and  misunderstandings  which  had  been largely over-
come  at  the  Luxembourg  conference  of Foreign Ministers, 
nothing had  changed in the  need  "to  build Europe".  The 
Federal Republic  and  France  were  predestined  to  make  it 
clear by  their  own  action and  their  own  initiatives  "that 
the  present  situation in Europe  is unsatisfactory".  Dr. 
Erhard  said that  there  was  a  danger  that  the  peoples  of 
Europe  would  "choke  with  opulence"  unless  new  ways  were 
shown  to  them. 
Secretary-of-State von Rase  summarized  the  outcome  of  the 
Paris  talks  as  follows: 
1)  Germany  and  France  shared  the  view  that European poli-
tical co-operation between  the  Six  should  be  revital-
ized; 
2)  The  implementation  of  the  overall  programme  for  the 
EEC  agreed  upon in Luxembourg  ranked  as  a  first 
priority; 
3)  General  de  Gaulle's visit  to  Moscow  would  offer an 
opportunity to  put  forward  the  European  standpoint, 
particularly as  regards France's attitude  to  the  need 
for  the  reunification of  Germany; 
4)  The  consultation machinery  of  the  Franco-German Treaty 
would  be  broadened  t~ include  co-operation in the 
scientific field; 
5)  Both  partners were  of the  opinion that  the  Franco-
German  Treaty has  given satisfactory results and  would 
continue  to  bear fruit with increasing implementation. 
Federal Chancellor Erhard  stated in a  summary  of  the 
talks that  the  Franco-German Treaty  should  be  "extensive-
ly interpreted"  and  that its extension to  scientific  co-
operation provided  tangible  evidence  of this.  The  Feder-
al  Government  and  the  German  people  need  have  no  worry 
about  General  de  Gaulle's  State visit to  the  Soviet  Union 
but  look  forward  to  the  result  of this visit with  some 
nervousness  and  expectation. 
After his return from Paris,  the  Federal  Chancellor pre-
sented  a  detailed report  to  the  Cabinet  which was  ampli-
fied  by Ministers  Schroder  and  Schmucker.  Thereupon  the 
Government's  spokesman  stated before  the  press  that  the 
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spoke  for themselves  and  that in German  and  French  eyes 
it had  been  a  satisfactory meeting.  The  French side  had 
clearly given to understand that there  could be  no  peace 
in Europe  without  German  reunification.  After Federal 
Chancellor Erhard had left France,  he  sent  the  French 
President  the  following  telegram: 
"I  am  returning to  Germany with the  feeling that we  have 
succeeded in increasing the  number  of  our friendly meet-
ings which will certainly be  of value  to  our  two  peoples 
and  to  Europe. 
What  today clearly shows  is an atmosphere  of  calm confi-
dence  and  direct understanding.  The  feeling  of Community 
which is active in both peoples will enable  us  to  overcome 
all difficulties and  obstacles that lie in the  way  to  an 
ever increasing and  close practical collaboration." 
After the  pessimistic  forecasts  before  the  Erhard/de 
Gaulle  meeting,  the  results  of the  talks were  regarded  as 
a  positive  achievement  in Bonn.  At  all events prevailing 
opinion in Bonn  was  that relations between  Germany  and 
France  were  less tense  and  more  friendly.  Factors  that 
contribute  to  this result were  in particular the  exclusion 
of  a  number  of controversial questions  of political fore-
casts and  the  fact  that  the  talks  were  confined  to  prac-
tical co-operation.  It was  particularly emphasized  that 
the  rapprochement  achieved in Luxembourg,  a  few  days  be-
fore  had  been confirmed in Paris.  Mr.  Majonica,  Chairman 
of the  CDU  Foreign Policy Working Party,  described  the 
Paris meeting as  successful.  He  dwelt  in particular on 
three  points.  In conjunction with  the  decisions  taken by 
the  Council  of Ministers  of the  EEC,  it had  been decided 
in Paris  to  treat  the  Brussels  programme  as first priority 
so  that  the  meeting between General  de  Gaulle  and  Dr. 
Erhard  should not  stop at  the  stage  of mere  declarations 
of intent. 
The  statement  that European co-operation should be  revi-
talized also  meant  that  the  notion of political co-opera-
tion  should be  furthered.  Moreover,  the  German  question 
would  be  in the  forefront  of the  East-West  talks during 
President  de  Gaulle's state visit to Moscow. 
The  Social Democrats  welcomed  above  all the  improvement 
in the  climate  between  Bonn  and  Paris.  The  Deputy-
Chairman  of  the  SPD,  Mr.  Wehner,  said  that if the  exten-
sion of the  Franco-German consultation machinery  and  of 
scientific collaboration was  brought  about,  this would  be 
an important  step forward  whatever other divergencies 
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ings  about  the  reference in the  communique  to  the  fact 
that  General  de  Gaulle  intended to  put  forward  the 
"European  standpoint" in Moscow  since  there  were  several 
European  standpoints  over which  agreement  had  still to  be 
reached.  The  free  Democrats  who  had  viewed  the  Paris 
meeting with  some  scepticism,  described  the  results as  a 
good  starting point for pursuing the  talks within the 
framework  of the  Community.  This  applied particularly to 
the  agreement  to  give  priority to  the  overall  programme 
decided upon in Luxembourg.  Mr.  von Kuhlmann-Stumm, 
leader  of the  FDP  Group,  also  drew  attention to  General 
de  Gaulle's willingness  to  discuss  Germany's  reunifica-
tion during  the  Moscow  talks  during his Moscow visit.  On 
this point  the  Hamburg  "Welt"  observed:  "Admittedly  the 
reunification of  Germany  for  de  Gaulle  lies embedded  in a 
rapprochement  between Western  and  Eastern Europe,  that is 
in a  long process,  but  the  newly-won  impression that  the 
General is a  spokesman for  German interests,  should  from 
now  on have  a  favourable  effect  on Franco-German rela-
tions."  (Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  5,  7,  8,  9  and 
10  February  1966;  Die  Welt,  29  January,  8,  9  and  10 
February  1966;  Le  Monde,  9  February  1966;  Neue  Zurcher 
Zeitung,  9  and  10  February  1966) 
4.  Italian comments  on  the  Luxembourg  conference 
On  his return to  Rome  Mr.  Colombo,  Minister for  the Treas-
ury  and  Head  of the  Italian Delegation to  the  Luxembourg 
conference,  expressed his  thoughts  on  the  agreements 
reached in an interview with  the  weekly  "La Discussione". 
Mr.  Colombo  stressed that  "France's return to  the  EEC 
Council  of Ministers after the  crisis of  30  June  means 
the  Community's  return to  normal life."  He  added  that 
although there  were  still differences  between  the  French 
Government  and  those  of  the  other Member  States,  Europe 
could not  develop without  France  and  he  ruled  out  the 
possibility of  a  Europe  of the  Five.  Not  only,  he  felt, 
had  the  Community  resumed its normal  operation but  also 
the  purpose  of this resumption had  been  achieved in that 
the  spirit and letter of the  Treaty had  been fully re-
spected. 
Mr.  Colombo  then went  on  to  discuss unanimous  or  qualififfi 
majority decisions  by  the  Six.  He  said:  "We  are  all 
agreed  that  although we  shall have  the  option to  take 
qualified majority decisions, it is desirable  that  every 
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difficult issues,  to  achieve  solutions that may  be  accept-
ed by all and which  take  into  account  the interests of 
all,  especially during this delicate  and  difficult stage 
in the  construction of the  Community  edifice which will 
continue until the  ~nd of the  transitional period."  Mr. 
Colombo  trusted that there would  be  a  complete  revival of 
the  Community  spirit  and  that no  prejudicial division 
would  cause  a  split between the  members  of the  Council; 
he  went  on  to  say that:  "It will certainly be  the  duty  of 
all those  who  firmly  support  the  supranational idea to 
come  vigorously to  the  defence  of all that is supranation-
al in the  Treaty under all circumstances." 
Mr.  Colombo  concluded his interview with  "La Discussione" 
by  saying:  "The  best  and wisest move  that  could be  made 
to  promote  the  revival  of the political Europe  would  be 
to  make  the  three  Communities,  which might  be  described 
as  the  nucleus  of the  political Europe,  operate normally 
and  expeditiously and  to  keep alive  the  European ideal 
for all the  peoples  of the  old continent,  especially the 
younger generations,  because  political moves  originate 
and  succeed when  they have  their roots in the  solid con-
victions  of  the  public  at large." 
Mr.  Colombo  returned  to  this  theme  in an interview which 
he  subsequently gave  to  the  weekly  "L'Europeo",  when  he 
said:  "It has  always  been  our  aim to bring the  French 
back into  the  Community  both because  a  Community  of the 
Five  would  not  have  the  balance  that would  make  it valid 
in Italian eyes  and  because  the  Europe  of the  Six,  not 
that  of the  Five is,  as  I  see it, the  essential prerequi-
site for  the  accession of the  United Kingdom."  On  this 
latter point,  he  said:  "I  have  always  been  convinced that 
the  EEC  needs  the  United Kingdom.  There is no  doubt  that 
had  the  United Kingdom been in the  EEC  this crisis would 
have  been much  easier to manage."  He  concluded:  "Our 
duty  today  now  that this crisis has been  overcome is to 
promote  the life of the  Community  in such  a  way  as to 
induce  the United Kingdom  to  renew its efforts to  join 
us." 
At  the  same  time  Mr.  Zagari,  Under-Secretary-of-State  for 
Foreign Affairs,  who  was  a  member  of  the Italian Delega-
tion in Luxembourg,  expressed his thoughts in an inter-
view with the  daily  "Avanti!".  Mr.  Zagari  stressed the 
contribution that  the Italian Delegation had  made  to 
solving the  crisi~ that had  racked  the  EEC.  He  argued 
that  the  Luxembourg  statement had  to  put  an  end  to  the 
empty  chair policy  and  as far as  the  majority vote  system 
was  concerned,  it had re-affirmed the validity of the 
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of  doubt  this means  that  one  of the  principles ideologic-
ally and  politically axiomatic  to  the  Europe  of nation 
states theory has  been  overcome." 
Mr.  Zagari  said that  one  encouraging lesson could  be 
learned  from the  crisis,  namely  that  "the unity of Europe 
measures  up  to  the  criteria and  requirements,  economic, 
financial,  technological,  scientific  and  social which in 
the  second half of  the  twentieth century cannot  be  gain-
said either in the  name  of balance-of-power theory or in 
that  of  any  factious  theoretical doctrine."  He  went  on 
to  maintain that  the  Community crisis had  been  overcome 
because it had  been  a  growth crisis and  not  one  affecting 
its underlying purpose.  Indeed,  he  said:  "economic  reali-
ties have  prevailed  over  purely political considerations 
because  expanding  and  making  the  most  of relations with 
the  East  European countries in economic,  technical,  scien-
tific and  trade  terms  was  no  longer the  exclusive  proviwe 
of  third-force  diplomatic  strategy but  had  become  common 
ground  for  co-ordinated efforts by  the  democratic  coun-
tries of Western Europe  who  were  aware  of its relevance 
to  peace  and  world  disarmament." 
Mr.  Zagari  concluded  by  expressing the  satisfaction of 
the  Italian Government  at  the  rejection of  the  idea of  a 
Europe  of  the  Five  and  at  the  democratic  development  of  a 
wider  economic  and  political Europe;  the  reasons  for this 
satisfaction lay in the  decisive  importance  of  the  French 
contribution to  the unification process  and  in an  aware-
ness  that  had  events  taken  a  different  course,  the 
chances  of British accession to  a  body in the  throes  of 
a  crisis would inevitably have  volatilized and  that  a 
dissolution would  have  constituted an unfortunate  regres-
sion in relation to  what  had  previously been  achieved  and 
in terms  of  progress  from  the  present  community  of the 
Six  to  that  of  a  greater Europe.  ("La  Discussione",  6 
February  1966;  "L'Europeo",  10  February  1966;  "Avanti!", 
2  February  1966) 
5.  French  opinions  on  the  meeting  of EEC  Ministers in 
Luxembourg 
Mr.  Pierre  Pflimlin,  President  of  the  Consultative  Assem-
bly of  the  Council  of Europe,  considered  "the  outcome  of 
the  Luxembourg meeting would  appear  to  be  positive.  From 
the  standpoint  of French interests,  the  meeting  removed 
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and  French agriculture:  the  dissolution of the  Common 
Market  and its continuation without  France.  From  the 
standpoint  of the  European edifice  and its chances  of 
development,  it was  essential that  the  Treaty of Rome 
should  remain intact,  even though  some  of the  machinery 
laid down  by  the  Six for putting it into effect may  give 
rise  to difficulties.  In this respect,  the  spirit matter-
ed  more  than the letter.  The  Community will live if the 
Community  spirit prevails  over national pride  and  egotism, 
if conciliatory and  co-operative  methods  take  the  place  of 
threats  and injunctions." 
Mr.  Jean Lecanuet,  President  of  the  Centre  Democrate, 
said:  "As  far as  the  immediate  future is concerned,  the 
salient fact is that France  has  resumed  the  seat in 
Brussels that  she  should never have  left.  France  has 
thus  shied  away  from  any final breach.  The  worst has 
been averted.  This would not have  been possible without 
the  pressure in France  of public  opinion which voiced its 
support  for the  European idea during the  presidential 
election. 
All  that  can be  hoped for,  in the  immediate  future,  is 
that we  may  prevent  the  destruction of what  has  been 
initiated.  But  real progress  towards unity in Europe  will 
only  come  with a  change  of political leadership in France." 
Mr.  Jean Monnet  stated that:  "Reason  and necessity have 
prevailed.  This  clearly demonstrates  that when  the  Six 
discuss  and  when  they continue  their dialogue  they ulti-
mately reach agreement.  This  could have  happened in 
July. 
After several months  of inactivity,  the  Common  Market is 
to  resume  its forward  march for the  good  of all without 
prejudice  to  the  Treaties  or to  the  essential role  of the 
European Commission. 
I  earnestly hope  that  the  governments will  choose  men  of 
ability,  for much  will depend  on  the  strength of the  Com-
mission.  I  also trust that  they will be  able  to  ensure 
the  stability and  continuity of that institution.  Stabili-
ty  and  continuity are  indispensable in each of the  six 
countries;  they are  even more  indispensable in a  Community 
in the  making." 
Mr.  Frangois Mitterand  said:  "General  de  Gaulle's policy 
has wasted  many  months,  from  the  point  of view  of Europe, 
France  and  the  French farmer.  I  am  delighted that  the 
Government  has  at last recognised  the validity of the 
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paign. ·  I  only hope  that this agreement  is sincere  and 
that it will last and  that further  developments will  make 
it possible  for us  to  continue  along the  course  now  open 
to us." 
Mr.  Maurice  Faure  said:  "The  essential point is whether 
we  are  now  prepared  to  respect  the  principle  of  common 
institutions or whether  we  are  going  to  persist in an 
attempt  to  return to  a  purely intergovernmental  system 
based  on vetos  and  individual  moods. 
Nothing yet  has  been either compromised  or  salvaged.  Con-
sidering the  extent  of  our  apprehensions,  this  can  be 
regarded  as  an  opening  and  hence  as  a  positive  outcome." 
Mr.  Pleven wondered  why  the  French  Government  had  started 
the  crisis of  30  June  instead  of  continuing  to  negotiate 
as it had  recently  done  in Luxembourg. 
Mr.  Guy  Mollet  stated that it would  be  necessary,  in the 
near future,  to  create  the  United States  of Europe.  Thus 
if France's partners had averted  dissolution,  they had 
been right in doing  so,  w·hich  allowed  one  to  hope  that 
the  European idea would  remain alive  amongst  them  and  that 
it would  revive  in France  once  de  Gaulle  had  gone.  Howeve~ 
a  lot of  time  and,  perhaps,  a  lot of opportunities  too, 
had  been wasted. 
Mr.  Jacques  Baumel,  Secretary-General  of  the  Ulffi  said: 
"Conditions  are  today much  more  favourable  to  the  entry 
of the  United Kingdom into  the  Common  Market  than  they 
were  before." 
Satisfaction was  also  exvressed in professional circles. 
Mr.  de  Caffarelli  (INSEAJ  f·el  t  that  "it would  have  been 
impossible  to  revalorize  farm  earnings without  achieving 
a  common  agricultural market.  There  remains  a  lot  to  be 
done  before  this unification is fully  completed,  especial-
ly as  regards  (a)  markets  which  are  not  yet  subject  to 
regulations  and  (b)  financing  the  common  agricultural 
policy."  Mr.  Villiers said that  the  French Employers' 
Council  was  delighted at  the  happy  outcome  to  the  Common 
Market  crisis.  It was  full  of hope  for  the  future. 
French  employers  had  always  been very attached  to  the 
basic  idea of  the  common  market,  which  was  a  comprehensive 
concept.  They  were  thus  pleased that  discussions in re-
gard  to  regulations  on  financing agriculture would  shortly 
be  resumed.  They  trusted that  the  Six would  also  jointly 
broach the Kennedy  Round  so  that Europe  could bring its 
full  weight  to  bear in them.  Work  towards  economic  union 
- 14  -had  now  to  be  accelerated  so  that union would  be  finalized 
at  the  same  time  as  customs  were  dismantled."  (Le  Mende, 
1 February  1966;  Forces Nouvelles,  3  February  1966) 
6.  France  and Europe 
a)  Europe  in the  campaign for  the  presidential election 
European questions  loomed large in the  French presidential 
election.  The  Common  Market  crisis which  came  to  a  head 
on  30  June  1965,  had  caused  strong feelings in French 
economical  and political circles.  At  his press  conference 
of  9  September  1965,  General  de  Gaulle  discussed  the  Com-
munity  experience  as  a  whole  and  stated that it was  not 
on purely technical issues that  France  and her five  part-
ners disagreed;  in his  opinion,  the  division went  much 
deeper  and  centred  on  the  whole  concept  of Europe  and  the 
supranational issue.'  The  other candidates in the  presi-
dential election were  not unresponsive  to  the  attitude 
taken by  the  President.  Indeed,  Europe  became  one  of the 
main issues in the  election.  In the  period leading up  to 
the  first ballot  on  5  December  the  President  discussed 
Europe  on  only  one  occasion;  this was  on television on  30 
November  when  he  stated inter alia:  "The  new  Republic, 
which has worked  hard  and without  a  break  to unite Western 
Europe  and  which  has  achieved  some  measure  of  success, 
wants  this edifice  to  be  completed fairly  and  reasonably; 
it wants  French agriculture  to  become  a  full part  of the 
Common  Market  in fact,  without  any  so-called supranation-
al  commission or  any majority ruling being able  subse-
quently  to  call everything into  question.  If one  day  the 
question of organizing the  Six politically should arise, 
it does  not  want  France  to  run the risk of becoming 
involved,  as  a  result,  in any  prejudicial action in Europe 
of which  she  might not  approve.  In short,  the  new  Repub-
lic wants  to  take  every precaution to  ensure  that it re-
mains  able  to  safeguard in every respect its essential 
interests." 
In the  period leading up  to  the  second ballot,  General  de 
Gaulle  discussed  the  problem of French agriculture  on 
television on  13  December.  He  stressed the  efforts that 
his Government  had made  in this  connexion.  He  said that 
the  Common  Market  was  a  vital outlet for French agricul-
tural production and  that it could act as  a  powerful  stim-
ulus in  streamlining the  structure  of French agriculture. 
In his  speech  on television on  14  December  he  went  into 
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nothing  could be  more  logical than for neighbouring  coun-
tries to  form  a  European  common  market:  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  one  day 
probably,  Britain and  Spain,  and  perhaps  others.  This is 
a  geographic reality which  has  become  an  economic  reality 
because  these  countries have  moved  closer together  and 
are  directly and  immediately in touch with each  other, 
because  they have  the  same  kind  of  economy  and lastly be-
cause  competition today  has  become  a  necessity.  Competi-
tion is  the  spur that is indispensable  to  progress  and 
particularly indispensable  to  economic  expansion.  Again 
the  need is for  competition.  In short,  the  need is for  a 
large  market.  This is why  I  am  quite  convinced  and,  in-
deed,  why  I  believe  that  everyone  shares  the  view  that it 
is advisable,  useful  and  even necessary  to  complete  the 
creation of  a  common  market  between the  Six." 
General  de  Gaulle  added:  "It is not  I  who  made  the  Treaty 
of Rome  which,  in principle,  as  you  know,  set up  the 
Common  Market.  Had  I  been involved at  the  time  when  the 
Treaty  of Rome  was  concluded,  it would  probably have 
assumed  a  somewhat  diffe+ent  shape;  nonetheless,  I  accept-
ed it as it was  and  I  have  tried with my  Government  to 
make  the  best  of it."  He  then went  on  to  speak  of  the 
capital importance  of  the  Common  Market  from  the  point  of 
view  of French agriculture.  He  stressed the  work  done  by 
his  Government  to  bring agricultural  products within the 
scope  of Community regulations.  In this  connexion he 
said inter alia:  "We  shall have  to  resume  discussions  on 
this question  and  as  you  know  and  as  we  have  said,  we, 
the  French,  are  for  our' part  quite  ready  and  are  even 
determined  to  do  so,  provided,  of course,  that  these  dis-
cussions  lead to  a  successful conclusion and  provided 
that bringing French agriculture within the  scope  of  the 
Common  Market  and  thus  completing the  economic  entity of 
the  Six is not  made  contingent upon political conditions 
which  are  from  the  French standpoint  obviously unaccept-
able." 
This  brought  General  de  Gaulle  to  the  more  general  ques-
tion of solidarity between the  Western European coun-
tries;  in his  opinion,  the  main  task  should  consist in 
organizing this solidarity.  "The  question is how  this 
solidarity should  be  organized  and  what  form it should 
assume.  We  must  take  things  as  they  are  because  policies 
cannot  be  made  on  anything but realities."  He  said that 
the  realities were  the  six countries.  "It is these  coun-
tries that must  be  brought  together  and it is these  coun-
tries that must  gradually become  accustomed  to  living and 
acting together.  In this respec·t  I  should  be  the first 
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essential for this reason:  if we  succeed in organizing it 
and,  thence,  in establishing a  genuine  economic  solidari~ 
between  these  European countries,  we  shall have  gone  a 
long way  towards  achieving a  fundamental  rapprochement  and 
we  shall have  done  a  great  deal for our life in common." 
General  de  Gaulle  also  considered that  the  solidarity of 
the  Six  ought  to  be  organized in the  realm of defence. 
He  said that  co-operation between States was  indispensable 
and  that  the  French  Government  had  endeavoured  to  organize 
it.  "But  this attempt  was  not  successful  and  since  then 
nothing has  been done  except  by us  and  we  did  something 
with Germany,  that is we  solemnly  concluded  a  treaty of 
reconciliation and  co-operation which was  incredible after 
all that had happened.  So  far,  this has not  yielded very 
muoh  either.  Why?  Because  policies are  the  policies of 
States and  nothing can be  done  to  prevent this.  Now  there 
are  those  who  argue  "But  Europe,  the  supranational Europe, 
it is simply  a  question of bringing all that  together, it 
is simply  a  question of melting it all down  together,  the 
French with the  Germans,  the Italians with the English, 
etc."  Yes,  you know,  it is easy  and  sometimes it is an 
attractive proposition to  go  along with dreams,  to  go 
along with myths;  but  these  are  only  dreams,  these  are 
only myths;  but  there  are  also realities,  and realities 
cannot  be  dealt with like  that.  Realities are  dealt with 
on  thei~ own  terms  and  this is what  we  are  endeavouring 
to  do  and  what  we  intend to  continue  to  do.  If we  succeed 
in coming  through  the  trials of the  Common  Market  - and  I 
sincerely hope  we  shall -it will  be  necessary again to 
take  up  what  France  proposed in 1961  and  which was  not  at 
first  successful  - that is the  organization of  a  nascent 
political co-operation between the  States of Western 
Europe;  when  that  time  comes,  it is highly probable  that 
sooner  or later Britain will  come  and  join us  and  this 
will be  perfectly natural.  Of  course,  the  Europe  in 
question will not  be  what  is described as  supranational. 
It will be  what it is.  It will begin by being  a  co-opera-
tion and  perhaps  subsequently,  as  a  result of our living 
together, it will become  a  confederation." 
The  European plank was  also  part of the  platform of Mr. 
Fran9ois Mitterand,  the  candidate  of the Left.  On  21 
September he  stated:  "Europe  is a  great hope,  it is also 
a  need  •••  Europe  is the  surest means  whereby  France, 
which belongs  to  the  Atlantic Alliance  while  remaining 
firmly  attached to  the idea of peaceful  coexistence,  can 
preserve  and maintain its fundamental  links in the  West 
while  holding out  to  every country of  our  continent  a 
wide  open prospect  of a  Community  future."  In a  broad-
- 17  -cast  on  25  November,  Mr.  Mitterand criticized the  Gaullist 
view  of  the  construction of Europe:  "Europeans  must  have 
the  wisdom  to  progress via the  federal  stage  for this will 
allow  each  country  to retain its personality and  defend 
its interests while  belonging to  a  whole.  I  should  consid-
er that  I  had  served  the  interests of France  very well 
and  those  of  the Left  and  the  workers in general,  espe-
cially the  working  class  and  the  farm population,  if I 
were  able  to bring them together in support  of  a  simple 
idea for  the  construction of Europe.  Such  a  Europe  would 
have  to  be  free  from  American hegemony.  And  only  a 
political Europe  would  dare  to  enter into  discussions with 
the  East  European countries.  In Brussels,  on  30  June  I 
should  have  been  as  severe  as  General  de  Gaulle  in my 
attitude  to  the  claims  of  Germany  and  the  Netherlands in 
particular.  But  had  the  attitude  of  General  de  Gaulle 
been more  than  a  pretext he  would  have  had  recourse  to 
the  procedure  laid  down  in the  Treaty  of  Rome  for settl-
ing disputes;  that is what  I  would  have  done." 
In an interview published in Le  Monde  on  2  December,  Mr. 
Mitterand  analyzed  the  whole  range  of agricultural prob-
lems  from  the  European  standpoint.  He  stated inter alia 
that:  "It is not  for  France  to  lay  down  conditions for 
the  resumption  of  the  agricultural negotiations.  When 
France  has  resumed  her  seat  on  the  Council  of Ministers, 
she  will  be  able  either to  take  the  Commission memoran-
dum  of  22  July as  a  basis for  discussions  or else  to  make 
fresh proposals.  It is certain that indispensable 
concessions will have  to  be  obtained  from  the  Netherlands 
and  from  Germany. 
But  France will have  to  go  one  step further.  Far  from 
attacking  "delusive  and  chimerical myths"  she  should 
suggest  to  her partners that  the  construction of Europe 
should  progress in federalist  stages,  which  would  enable 
each  country  to  preserve its personality.  I  have  decided 
my  attitude:  I  am  against  the  Europe  of monopolies  and 
the  Europe  of technocrats;  I  am  for  the  political Europe 
which is a  factor for peaceful  coexistence  and  economic 
and  social progress." 
On  the  eve  of  the  second ballot,  the  European plank in 
Mr.  Mitterand's electoral platform assumed  greater im-
portance  when  he  met  leaders of the  farm unions  on  10 
December.  He  said:  "As  far  as  French agriculture is con-
cerned  there is no  alternative  to  the  Common  Market.  All 
the  reliable  studies that have  been  carried  out  prove 
this.  French agriculture  can neither fall back  on its 
own  territory without  limiting its production in a  dra-
conian manner,  nor  can it openly  compete  on  the  world 
- 18  -markets where  there is a  great  deal  of  dumping without 
prices dropping  sharply.  Yet it is not  a  question of 
accepting just  any  agricultural  common  market:  it must  be 
one  that is beneficial to  the  producer;  Community  prefer-
ence  must  thus be  clearly articulated and  positive  action 
must  be  taken to  direct production in a  sound  manner in 
relation to markets  (a)  by  simultaneously setting common 
guide  ~rices for  the  main products,  (b)  by  specialization 
and  (c)  by  encouraging priority investment;  action should 
also  be  taken to  organize  transport,  stock-piling and  the 
marketing of products within the  European  framework  and 
to  harmonize  social protection for  the  farmer." 
Mr.  Mitterand also  outlined his European political ideas 
in his  speech on television on  11  December:  "We  must  buiJd 
Europe,  a  political Europe,  along  the lines adopted  so 
far in the  economic  and  technical fields.  This Europe 
must  be  the  decisive  factor in the  peaceful  coexistence 
initiated at Vienna  some  years  ago  between Presidents 
Kennedy  and Khrushchev.  This Europe  must  be  open to  any 
country ready  to  accept its common  obligations.  It must 
form the basis for  a  union against  any  hegemony in order 
that  peace  may  triumph.  What  I  have  to  offer - for  my 
part  - is not  a  variety of policies which  change  every 
six months  but  a  foreign policy based principally on the 
defence  of  peace  and  on the  enlargement  of the  political 
communities."  Speaking  on the  radio  the  day  after he 
said:  "It is on  the  contrary to  have  faith in our nation-
al genius  to want  to build Europe  on  the basis of reality. 
There  is a  decisive  Europe,  the  economic  and  technical 
Europe  of the  Six.  It would  now  be  appropriate  for this 
Europe  of the  Six  to  be  endowed with common  political 
institutions as  soon as  possible if we  do  not wish to 
allow  the  senior officials who  direct  them  and  the  car-
tels and  monopolies,  that is the  concentration of finan-
cial power  they contain,  to  do  with them what  they will." 
Mr.  Jean Lecanuet,  the  candidate  of the Centre,  ~lso made 
Europe  the  principal plank in his election platform.  At 
his press  conference  on  26  October,  he  set forth  the 
problem clearly:  "For  a  France  whose  opportunities have 
been dissipated,  we  propose  modernization along  the  path 
of recovery.  But  the  scale  of  such modernization must 
not  be  that  of France  but  that  of  the united Europe  ••• 
the  difficulties that would  ensue  for industry,  its struc-
tures,  labour and  management if the  Common  Market  were 
suspended would  be  no  less serious  than for agriculture." 
On  the  level  of politics proper he  added:  "In a  world 
dominated  by  the  giants  - the  USA,  the  USSR  and,  tomorrow, 
China  - in a  century of continents that  are  organized, 
there is no  salvation for  the nation State  except  through 
- 19  -becoming  an integral part  of free  Europe.  Freedom and 
independence  have  a  reality only if they are  based  on 
power  and  we  can have  no  power  except  in a  united Europe 
•••  a  united Europe  is the  only practical way in which  we 
can bring our enterprises up  to  the  operating scale  of 
modern  times  and  hence  compete  with the  economic  powers 
across  the  Atlantic.  It is also  the  only way  in which  we 
can establish a  genuine  military balance  including,  if 
necessary,  the  nuclear  component  within  the  Atlantic 
Alliance  and  thus  allow  of  co-operation between equal 
partners,  that is between  the  united Europe  and  the  United 
States of America. 
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The  Gaullist  theories were  subject  to very  strong criti-
cism  on  this  occasion  from  the  candidate  of the  Centre. 
"Bogged  down  as  the unification of Europe  now  is,  the 
problem is no  longer whether,  how  and  when  Europe  will be 
federal  or not,  but  whether it is to  be  united  or broken. 
If the  French people  support us,  relaunching Europe  will 
be  the  first act  of  a  new  policy.  France will  resume  the 
seat in Brussels that  she  left on  30  June.  The  Treaty of 
Rome  will be  respected in the letter and  in the  spirit as 
will  the  essential regulations  of  the  European institu-
tions,  axiomatic  to  the  success  of this undertaking.  A 
summit  conference  of the  six Community  countries would 
work  out  a  common  policy.  It has  been  shown  that without 
political resolve  the  economic  machinery breaks  down.  The 
political integration of Europe  is the  key  to  the  future. 
Peace  and  progress  depend  on it." 
Having  thus  outlined  the  main points in his European poli-
cy  on  26  October,  Mr.  Jean Lecanuet  went  on  to  discuss 
agriculture in his  speech  on  television on  26  November. 
He  said,  inter alia:  "The  essence  of the  agricultural 
problem is the  Common  Market.  For many  years,  the  Govern-
ment  itself has  acted in recognition of this  after being 
converted to  the  idea of  Europe.  Why?  The  Common  Market 
offers  the  French farmer  the  certainty that  he  will  be 
able  to  sell at  a  better price  and  find  markets in Europe. 
If we  make  the  Common  Market,  Europe  will offer exception-
al opportunities to  French agriculture.  And  now  the 
Government  states that  the  Common  Market  is not  essential, 
that  we  could  do  without it.  This is not  true.  The  only 
alternative  solution is malthusianism,  a  reduction in 
production and  consequently  a  rural  exodus  and  the  end  of 
family  enterprise.  We  must  save  the  Common  Market,  France 
must  go  back  to  Brussels.  This is what  I  should  do  if I 
were  elected." 
Speaking in Strasbourg the  same  day,  he  reaffirmed the 
essential principles  of  a  political construction of Europe 
- 20  -in the  following words:  "France in motion  towards  the 
United States of Europe:  that is what  we  wish to bring 
about.  If I  were  elected the first thing I  should  do 
would  be  to  meet  Heads  of State  of the  Community  to re-
launch the  Common  Market  and  have  France  resume  her  seat 
in Brussels.  Talks  ought  to  be  begun at  once  to  relaunch 
Europe  politically and  to  create  a  commission  on  the 
model  of the Hallstein Commission to  draw  up  a  treaty on 
the  political union of Europe.  I  am  in favour  of the 
election of  a  European Parliament  by universal  suffrage, 
of the  election of a  federal  president  and  possibly,  of a 
referendum  on Europe." 
Mr.  Jean Lecanuet  wound  up his  campaign in favour  of 
Europe  with a  message  given out  on  the  day  after the  first 
ballot.  His  statement  published on  9  December  closed with 
these  words:  "I  am  completely  convinced that  the  construc-
tion of a  politically united Europe  could  be  decisive  for 
the  future  of  our  country.  I  must  emphasize  how  serious 
any halt in the  march  towards  a  united Europe  could be. 
There  can be  no  question of just any Europe.  We  must 
give  our  support  to  the  existing communities  and  their 
institutions and  respect  the  Treaty of Rome.  We  must 
start  on  the  course  towards  political unity in order  to 
attain gradually but resolutely to  the  United States of 
Europe.  The  united Europe  must  also  become  the  equal 
partner of  the  United States of America within the  Atlan-
tic Alliance." 
European policy also  featured in the  campaigns  of the 
other presidential candidates.  Mr.  Tixier-Vignancour 
criticized the  Gaullist  theory of Europe  in a  statement 
in "Le  Monde"  on  2  December.  He  argued:  "General  de 
Gaulle's flirtation with the  East is obviously incompat-
ible with marriage  to  the  West."  He  added  that  "the Euro-
pean construction is only possible in terms  of the  Atlan-
tic option because  security is the  overriding considera-
tion.  An  independent  Europe  in the  Gaullist  sense is a 
chimera.  A united Europe  welded  to  the  USA  by  the  Alli-
ance,  for its security and its prosperity,  this is the 
only future  for us all.  I  should further like to make 
clear that  those  who  in this presidential election profess 
their support  for  the  European construction cannot  be 
speaking  seriously unless their economic  option is to keep 
faith with freedom  and  private enterprise  and  to reject 
any  form  of  planned  economy.  A marxist  or economically 
controlled France  would  enter Europe  under  an insurmount-
able  handicap with respect  to  the  countries which  put 
their trust in the  personal  qualities of individuals  and 
where  the  State  administers  and  guides without  trespass-
ing on  the  freedom of the  individual." 
- 21  -Mr.  Marcilhacy  tackled  the  agricultural problem on tele-
vision on  30  November:  "The  farmer will be  saved  or lost 
depending  on whether  the  Common  Market  is realized or  -
as  we  may  fear  - postponed.  I  am  in favour  of  a  resump-
tion of  the  Brussels negotiations."  On  the  political 
level,  Mr.  Marcilhacy  affirmed in an interview in  "Le 
Monde"  on  2  December  that  what  was  necessary was  an inte-
grated united Europe  with  a  European parliament  and  a 
European  government.  He  added:  "The  Treaty  of Rome  opens 
up  the  prospect  of  a  united Europe.  One  cannot  reject 
any  idea of  supranational  power  without misconstruing its 
underlying purpose.  The  Treaty  of Rome  is not  static but 
a  creator of laws.  France  must  therefore  resume  her  seat 
and  then,  without  prere~uisites, vigorously defend her 
own  interests." 
b)  French political life  and  European  problems  after 
the  re-election of  General  de  Gaulle 
Speaking  on  31  December,  the  President  of  the  Republic 
stated:  "We  can resume  the  organization of  the  Common 
Market  of  the  Six but  under  conditions  that  are  fair  and 
reasonable  and  with the  hope  that  on  such  a  basis  other 
neighbours will  join it." 
The  decision taken by  the  French  Government  on  5 January 
1966  to  lower its customs  duties  against  EEC  Member 
States by  10  per cent,  showed  France's resolve  to  respect 
the  Community  deadlines.  The  Government  furthermore 
would  allow  a  period  of  four  months  for the  approximation 
towards  the  common  customs  tariff. 
On  2  February,  the  Council  of Ministers  approved  the 
decisions  taken in Luxembourg  on:11-18 and  28-29 January 
and  expressed its satisfaction at  the  prospects  they held 
out  for  economic  co-operation.  The  need  for political co-
operation in Europe,  a  subject  about  which  the  French 
Government  had  long since  defined its attitude  and  made 
proposals,  was  also  stressed.  At  his press  conference  on 
21  February,  General  de  Gaulle  once  again stressed the 
official French viewpoint  on  Europe. 
Mr.  Giscard  d'  Estaing  defined  the  attitude  of  the  Inde-
pendent  Republicans,  after which  the  positions of all the 
parties in the  governmental  maJority were  known.  In 
Clermont-Ferrand  on  20  February  the  former  Finance  Minis-
ter stated:  "As  Europeans  we  believe  that  we  need  to unite 
our  continent.  We  are  not  unaware  either of the  obstacles 
still standing in our path,  the  most  serious  of which  are 
- 22  -in no  way  attributable  to France,  or of the  need  carefully 
to  protect  the interests of our country during difficult 
negotiations.  We  wish,  however,  to direct  our  economic, 
social  and political reflections  towards  a  construction 
which is one  of the  greatest tasks  ahead  of us." 
The  opposition as  a  whole  drew  the  relevant  conclusions 
from  the  presidential election.  The  Communists  were  the 
first to broach European  questions.  On  4 January,  Mr. 
Rene  Piquet  submitted  to  the Central Committee  of the 
French Communist  Party a  report illustrating the  develop-
ment  of extreme Left attitudes  on  this subject.  The 
report  began along traditional Communist  lines:  the  Common 
Market  was  in fact  simply  the result of  a  general  agree-
ment  between the  major capitalist monopolies.  The  rap-
porteur felt,  however,  that French Communists  should re-
cognize:  "that the  Common  Market  exists and  that parties 
such  as  the  Socialist Party,  the Unified Socialist Party 
and the Radical Party,  support it."  He  felt that  the 
Communist  and Socialist Parties and  the  other supporters 
of the  European institutions could  co-operate  actively 
within the  European institutions in the  Common  Market  to 
promote  a  policy,  other than that  of trusts and  cartels, 
whic~ attached  due  weight  to  the interests of the workers 
in each country  and to French national interests.  He 
added:  "As  a  member  of the  Common  Market,  France  could 
take  the initiative to  promote  the  development  of trade 
between all countries without  discrimination,  on the  basis 
of equality and mutual benefits.  Measures  could also  be 
taken to  deprive  the  Common  Market  institutions of their 
technocratic  character,  which implies that  the  elected 
assemblies in each  country  and the  unions  should  be  re-
presented  and  be  endowed  with  real  powers.  In short, 
despite  differences which  continue  to  exist  we  believe 
that  an  agreement  on  a  common  policy is possible  provided 
this is directed towards  peaceful  coexistence,  easing 
tension,  promoting co-operation between all the  countries 
of Europe  without  discrimination,  reducing armaments  and 
promoting controlled general  disarmament." 
Europe  remained  the  main  theme  for Mr.  Jean Lecanuet  and 
the  Democratic  Centre;  on  8  January the latter issued  a 
manifesto  calling for  a  political revival  and  the  creation 
of  a  new  political movement  to establish a  European social 
democracy.  It read:  "The  Common  Market  offers to  our 
economy  an  advantageous  competitive  framework  and  to  our 
agriculture  the  prospect  of greater markets,  improved re-
turns  and  joint finance.  The  development  of research, 
science  and  equipment  makes  a  Community  drive  at  the  Euro-
pean level increasingly necessary.  Partial agreements 
could  no  doubt  be  concluded but we  should not  make  the 
- 23  -mistake  of thinking that  the  operation and  progress  of 
the  EEC  can be  lastingly guaranteed without  a  common 
politic~l authority.  The  united Europe,  open  to Britain 
and  to  every  country accepting its rules,  has  become  a 
necessity.  The  nations  of Europe  cannot  achieve  power 
and  prosperity or real independence  except  through unity. 
Only  a  politically united Europe  will be  able  to  enjoy 
the  same  authority in the  world  as  the  USA  and  the  USSR. 
To  be  able  to  talk  on  equal  terms with  the  USA  within an 
Atlantic  Alliance  whose  balance is restored  and with the 
USSR  to  organize  and  consolidate  peaceful  coexistence, 
the united States of  Europe  could  offer to  the  third 
world  the  support  of Community  assistance  and  the  out-
flowing  of  a  new  humanism  to  the  whole  world.  Strong  and 
serene,  Europe  would in all international  organizations 
become  the  advocate  of  disarmament  and  the  architect  of 
peace." 
At  a  meeting at  the  "Mutualite"  on  7  February Mr.  Lecanuet 
discussed inter alia the  outcome  of  the  Luxembourg  confer-
ence.  "I  am  convinced  that  had  we  not  exerted  a  decisive 
pressure  during  the  electoral  campaign,  the  Common  Market 
which  was  brought  to  a  halt last year would  finally have 
been dissolved."  He  then criticized the  French  Govern-
ment  for introducing the  right  of veto  into  the  Community 
procedure. 
The  European  option was  also  confirmed  by  the  Democratic 
and  Socialist Federation,  whose  President is Mr.  Frangois 
Mitterand  and  includes  the  S.F.I.O.,  the Radical Party, 
the  U.D.S.R.  and  the  organizations  of  the Left.  On  8 
February  the  Executive  Committee  of this  Federation stawd 
that for  the  Social Democrats,  Europe  - the  first  organi-
zation  set up  through international resolve  - would  con-
stitute  a  Community  strong  enough  to  talk  on  equal  terms 
with Russia  and  China while  remaining the  friend  of the 
United States.  (Digest  based  on articles in  "Le  Monde" 
from  September  1965  to  February  1966) 
7.  The  President  of  the  French Republic  discusses  Europe 
At  his press  conference  on  21  February,  General  de  Gaulle 
spoke  inter alia of European  questions.  With reference 
to  the  agreement  reached in Luxembourg,  the  President  of 
the  Republic  states:  "This  agreement  between the  six 
Governments will have  favourable  and  far-reaching implica-
tions.  Indeed,  for  the first  time  since  the  Common  Market 
- 24  -got under way,  the  fiction  that the  economic  organization 
of Europe  should  come  under  an  authority other than that 
of  the  States, with  their powers  and  responsibilities, 
has been  openly  eschewed.  The  very fact  that the  foreign 
ministers have  successfully dealt with  these  questions 
away  from Brussels,  gives explicit recognition  to  the 
need  for a  political basis and  for political decisions 
to  achieve  success in the  economic  field; it also  gave 
explicit recognition  to  the  fact  that  such a  basis and 
such decisions were  a  matter for  the  States and  for  the 
States alone  and  that it was  for each of  the  governments 
to  assess whether the  measures  to  be  adopted  jointly were 
or were  not compatible with the  essential interests of 
their countries.  On  this basis it may  be  asked  whether 
the  economic negotiations which are  to  be  resumed  will 
lead  to  a  satisfactory result.  The  political issue  has 
to  be  settled. Whilst not underestimating the  value  of 
the  studies and  proposals of the Brussels  Commission, it 
has  in fact for  a  long  time  been  thanks  to  the inter-
vention of  the  States and,  with regard  to  the  common 
agricultural market,  thanks  to  the  intervention of France, 
that  the  European  economic  construction has  gradually 
overcome  its difficulties. But  the  imminent application 
of what is known  as  the  "majority"  rule  and  a  correspond-
ing increase in the  powers  of  the  Commission  threaten  to 
replace  this reasonable  practice by  a  permanent usurpatwn 
of  sovereignty.  Since  reason has prevailed, it may  be 
thought  that economic negotiations will be  continued 
under favourable  conditions. 
Is  this,  however,  to  be  the  sole  aim of European  ambiticn? 
Has  it to  be  conceded  that  the  six States of Western 
Europe,  who  have  just reached  agreement  on  the political 
conditions  concerning their economy,  must  abstain from 
dealing with other questions  amongst  themselves when  they 
themselves  are  the  ones principally affected?  In short, 
what  evil  spell would  make  it impossible  for  the  Six  to 
deal  amongst  themselves with political subjects of  common 
interest or to  organize  their political contacts?  France, 
of  course,  made  a  proposal  to  this effect a  long  time  agp. 
Subsequently,  the  German  Government,  the  Italian Govern-
ment  and  the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs put 
forward  similar proposals.  There  were  undoubtedly slight 
differences between  these  proposals but all were  agreed 
on  one  essential point:  that  the  six governments  should 
meet  regularly  to  consider together political subjects 
of  common  interest. Well,  since  Luxembourg,  the  economic 
organization of the  Six has  resumed  its normal  course  and 
France- considers  that it is more  advisable  than  ever  to 
put political meetings  of  this kind  onto  a  practical 
footing. 
- 25  -It goes without  saying that it is not  a  question  of  the 
Six's putting forward  absolute  theories as  to  what  ideaDy 
the  future  European  edifice  should  be,  of imposing a 
rigid  preconceived  framework  to  realities as  complex  and 
shifting as  those  of  the  life of our  continent and  its 
relations with  the  external world,  of considering  the 
problem of the  construction of Europe  solved before  we 
have  even  begun  to  live  together in political terms,  in 
short of getting lost once  again in  the  myths  and  ab-
stractions which have  always  prevented  the  Six from 
jointly undertaking anything beyond  the  painful adjust-
ment  of  their production  and  trade.  No!  What  is on  the 
contrary essential is for  them  to  meet  together  to  work 
with  the  aim  of  co-operating.  Indeed,  at  the  recent 
Franco-German  talks which  took place  when  Chancellor 
Erhard  visited Paris,  the  two  Governments  were  agreed  on 
this point  and  this  would  seem  to  me  to  be  one  of  the 
main  results of their cordial meetings. 
The  Six  should  concern  themselves with  the  security of 
the  Six,  bearing in mind  their close  reciprocal propin-
quity,  their geographic  and  hence,  their strategic situ-
ation,  their multifarious relations with neighbouring 
peoples:  Britain,  Spain,  Scandinavia,  etc.  or with  the 
United  States or with  the East European  countries  or with 
China or with Asia,  the  East, Africa,  Latin America;  they 
should  also  concern  themselves with dovetailing their 
action in  the  scientific,  technical,  cultural  and  spatial 
fields,  upon  which  the  future  of man  depends.  Since  move-
ment is proved  in motion  their solidarity will find its 
proof in co-operation. 
Must  this solidarity be  enclosed in a  kind  of political 
and  economic  citadel?  On  the  contrary,  once  union  is 
achieved  and,  all the  more  so,  once  the  Six have  been 
joined  by other countries,  they  could  and  should  be  a 
valid partner of the  United States in every sphere,  I 
mean  powerful  and  independent.  This  union  of the  Six can 
and  must  also  be  one  of  the  foundations  on  which  could 
gradually be  built the  balance,  the  co-operation and, 
perhaps  one  day,  the  union of  the  whole  of Europe  which 
would  enable  our continent peacefully  to  settle its own 
problems,  especially that  of  Germany,  including its 
reunification  and  to  achieve,  as  the  cradle of civi-
lization,  a  human  and  material  development  worthy  of its 
resources  and  its capacities. If this union  of  the  Six 
were  achieved  as of now,  it would  furthermore  be  a  posi-
tive  factor of  the first order in favour  of progress, 
understanding and  peace  among all the  peoples  of  the 
world. 
- 26  -That is why  if anyone  of  the  States which is engaged  with 
us in constructing the  European Economic  Community,  felt 
impelled in this spirit to  take  in turn  the initiative 
to  propose  a  political meeting of  the  six governments, 
France's response  would  be  positive  and  enthusiastic." 
(Le  Mende,  23  February  1966) 
8.  Joint resolution of  the  European  trade  union  organ-
~zations IBFG  and  IBCG  on  the  European  cr~s~s 
On  the  eve  of the  second  extraordinary session of  the 
EEC  Council  of Ministers in Luxembourg,  a  meeting was 
held  at Brussels between delegations  from  the Executive 
Committees  of  the  European  Secretariat of  the  Inter-
national  Confederation of Free  Trade  Unions  (IBFG)  and 
the  European  organization of  the  International Confeder-
ation of Christian  Trade  Unions  (IBCG)  under  the  joint 
chairmanship  of Bruno  Storti  (IBF~ and  Jacques Alders 
(IBCG). 
After examining  the  problems  thrown  up  by  the  current 
crisis in  the  Community,  the  meeting unanimously  adopted 
the  following resolution: 
The  trade  union federations  consider  that  the negotia-
tions  entered  into with  a  view  to  settling the present 
crisis must be  based  on  the  advances  made  since  1952  and 
must  be  such as  to  promote  the  actual progress of Euro-
pean integration while  conforming  to  the  Community 
Treaties. 
Such progress  stems  from  the  constant  confrontation of 
the European Executives'  view  of  the  Community  and  the 
national interests defended  by  the  various  Governments. 
This  confrontation,  which is constantly renewed  by  the . 
European Executives,  of itself ensures  the  smooth  oper-
ation and  development  of  the  Community,  one  of whose 
mainstays is the  rule  of majority decisions provided  for 
in  the  Treaty.  The  two  trade  union organizations are 
therefore  of  the  opinion  that the  drawing up  of a  pro-
gramme  of work in the  Commission's  absence  amounts  to  an 
assault on  the  institutional balance  of  the  Community. 
As  promoters of European unity and  guarantors of its de-
velopment,  the  trade  unions desire  to  take  a  greater part 
than  ever before in the  activities and  decisions of  the 
- 27  -Community.  They  therefore reject  the  attempt  to  encroach 
on  the  Commission's right  to  keep  the  public  informed 
regarding its activities and  to  maintain  contact with 
trade  unions. 
The  trade  union federations  of  the  IBFG  and  IBCG  hereby 
decide  to  step  up  their co-operation with an  eye  to  more 
vigorous  development  of  the  Community. 
9.  Memorandum  to  the  Federal  Government  of Germany  from 
the  German  Grou  of CEPES  (Euro  ean  Committee  for 
Economic  and  Social Progress 
On  25  January  1966  the  CEPES  Group  (Germany)  sent tele-
grams  to  Federal  Chancellor Erhard  and  Foreign Minister 
Schroder warning  them  against accepting French demands, 
that is, against  scrapping majority decisions in  the  EEC 
Council  of Ministers  and  undermining  the  position of  the 
EEC  Commission  in Brussels.  At  the  same  time  the  CEPES 
Group  handed  the  Federal  Government  a  memorandum  spelling 
out its views  on  the European crisis. 
The  CEPES  Group  considers  that the  Federal  Government 
should  do  its utmost- both under  the  Franco-German 
Treaty  and  in  the  EEC  Council  of Ministers - to  ensure 
France's return  to  constructive  collaboration in  the 
existing institutional  framework  of  the  EEC.  France 
should  be  told  by  the  five  other Governments  that  the 
Council  of Ministers must  now  deal with long-deferred 
and  urgent decisions  even in  the  absence  of French repre-
sentatives,  the  missing French vote  being treated  as  an 
abstention. Decisions  taken by  the  Council  on  a  proposal 
of  the  Commission  in  conformity with  the  Treaty would  be 
communicated  to  the  French  Government  in writing,  and 
would  be  binding throughout  the  entire  territory of  the 
EEC  including France. 
As  long as  France  kept  away  from  the  Council  of Ministers, 
the  Commission  and  the  Council  should  endeavour  to  safe-
guard  France's legitimate interests in any proposals or 
decisions.  The  Five  should  take  any decisions in  the 
Council  of Ministers  that were  necessary for  the  con-
tinued  development  of  the  Community.  The  merger of the 
three Executives  should,  however,  be  postponed until 
France  returned  to  the  Council  of Ministers,  so  as  to 
avoid  anticipating decisions  on  individual  appointments. 
- 28  -One  decision which,  in the  view  of the  CEPES  Group,  can 
no  longer be  put off, is to  widen  the  Commission's man-
date  for  the Kennedy  Round  negotiations.  So  long as 
France  did not expressly demand  to negotiate  on its own, 
the  Commission's mandate  would  also  embrace  France. 
Should  France  however wish  to  act independently,  an at-
tempt  could  still be  made  to  reach agreement as between 
the  Commission,  representing the  Five,  and  the  French 
delegation to  the  Kennedy  Round  at Geneva. 
Acceptance  of  the  French  demands  would  offer no  guarantee 
of confident collaboration between  the  EEC  partners in 
the  future.  On  the  contrary, it is to  be  feared  that ex-
isting tensions between members  would  be  heightened  since 
less reliance would  be  placed  on  a  Community  approach. 
Such  a  development would  also  adversely affect the  de-
cisions of enterprises in  the  Member  States. Large-scale 
investment  and  long-term business planning presuppose 
confidence  in  the  establishment of an  ever-closer customs 
and  economic  union.  The  expectations of many  undertakings 
would  be  disappointed  and  the  interpenetration of markets 
would  suffer a  set-back,  particularly as  growing mistrust 
would  give  a  fresh fillip  to nationalistic  trends in the 
various  economies.  Under  such  circumstances  the  EEC  would 
lose its "pull"  for other European  countries. In additioo., 
the  Kennedy  Round,  in which important  economic  interests 
of  the  European  countries are at stake,  would  be  doomed 
to  failure. 
10.  The  Xth Congress  of  the Italian Liberal Party 
The  Xth  Congress  of  the  Italian Liberal Party  (PLI)  was 
held  in Rome  from  4  to  8  February.  By  an  overwhelming 
majority  the  Conference  came  out in opposition  to  the 
Centre Left policy and  in support of a  return to  the  p&i-
cies  of  the  Centre.  The  Congress  confirmed  that  the  At-
lantic Alliance  and  European unity were  the  cardinal 
points of liberal foreign policy. 
Mr.  Malagodi,  Secretary-General of  the  PLI,  had  this to 
say  on  foreign policy in his report:  "The  European Eco-
nomic  Community  which in our eyes is in embryo  the  po-
litical federation  of  the  free nauons of  Europe,  is 
undergoing a  serious crisis.  The  Gaullists, who  at most 
want  a  customs union,  are  opposed  to it; they want  the 
least possible interference in the  domestic  economic  and 
- 29  -financial affairs of  the nations involved  and  an  arrange-
ment which leaves  them  free  to  take  the  final  decisions 
on major problems  of production  and  trade.  Our views lie 
at the  opposite  extreme.  We  endorse  what  has already been 
said in  the  Parliament with incomparable  authority by  our 
friend  Mr.  Gaetano Martino.  In response  to  Gaullism we 
must neither give  up  nor give  way.  We  consider exception-
able  the  compromise  recently  conceded  in  Luxembourg 
whereby  France  has  obtained unlimited  rights of dis-
cussion  tantamount  to  the  right of veto.  We  must  re~uire 
that the  Treaties which France  signed  be  respected  in 
full,  for  these  can neither be  denounced  nor violated  by 
any  country  that does not wish  to  be  excluded  from  the 
concourse  of free nations.  Once  the  Treaties are  fully 
implemented  at the  economic  level,  a  situation will arise 
whose  political implications will be  unavoidable.  In  the 
meantime,  we  should  take  advantage  of  every opportunity 
to  extend  the  Community  to  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
other EFTA  countries,  provided  only  they accept  the  con-
ditions laid  down  in  the  Treaties of  Rome." 
Mr.  Malagodi  then  said:  "The  Community  should be  outward-
looking,  as  the  Anglo-Americans  say,  not inward-looking 
or autarchic. It should  therefore  take  to  the Kennedy 
Round  the  desire  to  reach  a  successful  conclusion for 
without  these  negotiations  there is the  risk of are-
gression in the  United  States- which will lead  to are-
gression here  - towards  obsolete protectionist policies. 
Co-operation between  a  solid European  Community  and  the 
United  States  on  the  basis of trade,  which  should  be  as 
free  as possible, is essential if we  are  to  broach an-
other major international  economic  problem,  namely  that 
of monetary reserves.''  (Congress Proceedings,  Summary 
Report,  4-8  February  1966) 
- 30  -II. ECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  ECONOMIC  SECTORS 
1.  Addresses  on  Common  Market  and  agricultural policy at 
the  11Grtlrie  Woche"  in Berlin 
At  the  opening of  the  30th  "GrUne  Woche"  agricultural ex-
hibition in Berlin on  28  January  1966,  addresses were 
given by Professor Hallstein, President of the EEC  Com-
mission,  Mr.  Hocherl,  Federal  Food  Minister,  and  Mr.  Reh-
winkel, President of  the  German  Farmers•  Association. 
In his  opening address Mr.  Hocherl  stated  that the  price 
paid  for  the  Common  Market  should not be  the  surrender 
of  trading relations with non-member  countries.  This was 
why  the  Federal  Government was  anxious  that the  Kennedy 
Round  should  succeed.  An  upswing in world  trade would  not 
only benefit the  economy  as  a  whole  but also help  to in-
crease  Germany's  agricultural exports. Brisk and well-
balanced world  trade was  also  of value  to  the  developing 
countries in that it provided  them with  scope  to  help 
themselves.  German  agriculture was  taking steps  to  adapt 
itself to  market requirements.  The  quality of agricultur-
al products in particular had  to  be  improved,  and  also 
farm  and  market structures. 
Professor Hallstein pointed  out  that  the  Community  crisis 
had its good  side  as it highlighted  the  need  to  weigh  up 
what was  essential  and  what  could  be  discarded.  The  basic 
nece~sity to  achieve European unity  remain~d however un-
changed. Professor Hallstein called  upon  farmers  to  place 
their trust in the  Commission's agricultural policy. 
Agriculture was  an  integral part of  the  economy  and  must 
share  in any  economic  success.  In any  case  everything 
could not  always  remain  the  same  in  agricu~ture, whether 
a  Common  Market existed or not. At all events European 
unity held  out  the  prospect of agricultural reform;  so 
far  the  EEC•s  market organizations  had  brought only bene-
fits  to  agriculture. 
Mr.  Rehwinkel  would  deplore  any  attempts  to  patch up  the 
EEC  crisis and  advocated  that barriers between  the  EEC 
and  EFTA  should be  removed.  He  warned  against impatience 
as  the  enemy  of systematic progress  and  indirectly criti-
cised  the  EEC  Commission for having largely contributed 
to  the  EEC  crisis and  for being to  blame  for  the  economic 
split in Europe.  (Die  Welt,  29  January  1966,  7  February 
1966;  Le  Mende,  1  February  1966;  Frankfurter Allgemeine 
- 31  -Zeitung,  29  January  1966;  Industriekurier,  8  February 
1966) 
2. 
On  22  December  1965,  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  a-
dopted  an  opinion  on  the  implications of bringing forward 
the  completion  date  of  the  Customs  Union.  This  followed 
the  submission of  a  report by Mr.  J.  de  Precigout. 
The  Council  recalled  that the  Rome  Treaty had  required 
the Member  States  to  abolish all intra-Community  customs 
duties  and  to  apply  a  common  customs  tariff against third 
countries; it had  also  imposed  upon  them  common  policies 
on  external  trade  and  transport and,  more  generally, laid 
down  that they  should  co-ordinate  their policies and  ap-
proximate  their laws.  Thus,  it had  set up  an Economic 
Community  and  not merely  a  Customs  Union  or a  free  trade 
area. 
Whatever  the  completion  date  of  the  Customs  Union, it 
should  coincide with that of  the Economic  Union.  Thus, 
if one  date  were  brought  forward,  so  too  should  those  for 
achieving the  common  policies provided  for in the  Treaty 
and  the  necessary  economic  and  social approximations.  Al-
though  the  Common  Market was  having a  favourable  effect 
on  the  French  economy  and  would  do  so  increasingly in  the 
future,  in holding out,  to  French industry and  agricul-
ture,  market opportunities  commensurate  both with their 
needs  and  their potential, it raised difficult problems 
for various branches  of  the  economy  and  would  require 
France  to  undertake  a  major adjustment drive. 
a)  the  Customs  Union  would  as far as France  was  concerned, 
not only involve  the  abolition of all intra-Community 
duties but also  an  appreciable  reduction in her cus-
toms  duties against  third  countries  (in which respect 
she  differed  from all of her partners except  one)  and 
for which  there  would  be  no  counterpart; 
b)  there  were  also  signs  of relative weakness both in  the 
structure  and  the  trends of  the  French  economy;  the 
inadequate  investment in production  and  research was 
a  source  of  concern for  two  reasons:  because it was 
the  result of former weakness  and  because it might  be 
the  cause  of future  weakness. 
- 32  -The  time  that  these  adjustments  took would  depend  on  the 
extent to  which  the  needs  of France  were  taken into  con-
sideration in the  common  policies and  also  on what  was 
done  in France  to  eliminate unfavourable  disparities and 
promote  the necessary  changes. 
France's need  to  adjust gave  her special reasons for 
wanting  the  realization of  the Economic  Union  to  coincide 
with  the  establishment of  the  Customs  Union.  On  this  con-
dition, it would  be  possible  to  reconcile  the interests 
of France  (and  her legitimate  concern  to  effect  these 
adjustments without prejudice)  and  the  interests of her 
partners who  wished  to  see  the  Customs Unionirealized  as 
soon as possible, by means  of a  common  economic  policy 
that attached  due  weight  to  the realities of  the  French 
economy. 
The  Council  confined its attention to  the  essential ap-
proximations  and  the  common  policies and it recapitulated 
what  had  been  done  and  what  remained  to  be  done  at na-
tional and  Community  levels: 
a)  Social policy. Apart  from  ensuring equal pay for men 
and  women,  which had  not yet been  done,  and  maintaining 
equality in the  paid holiday dispensation,  e~ressly re-
ferred  to  in  the  Treaty,  the  latter provided  (in Articles 
117  and  118)  for a  further-reaching harmonization as  a 
result of  the  operation of  the  Common  Market  and  of  the 
approximation of legislative and  administrative provi-
sions.  There  had  been  a  time-lag in applying these arti-
cles,  which had  been prejudicial  to  the  social objectives 
of the  Treaty •. 
While  the  gross hourly rate including wages  and  social 
charges was  for a  long  time  higher in France  than in any 
other Common  Market  country- which was not without  con-
sequences- it had  been  seen  over the last two  years  that 
an  approximation had  been fairly general  on  this point, 
so  that in some  branches  and  in  some  countries the  gross 
wage  bill was  now  higher  than in France. 
In contrast,  great difficulties still arose  as  to  the 
make-up  of  this gross wage  bill,  the  amount  consisting 
in social  contributions being usually higher in France 
than in any  other Member  State  except  one.  To  some  extent 
this was  due  to  a  difference in the  ends in view,  to  the 
disparities in the  means  employed  and  in the  ways  in 
which  these were  financed.  The  result  of  these differ-
ences might be  inequalities from  one  country  to  another 
either between workers  or between  enterprises in the  same 
sector. 
- 33  -The  Council  recommended  that a  study be  made  of  the  meas-
ures  to  be  ~ken to  give  effect to  the  harmonization made 
possible  by  the  economic  development  of  the  Community  in 
the  most  socially beneficial manner possible  and  without 
prejudice  to  the  overall balance.  In more  general  terms, 
the  harmonizations  of  social progress  should be  actively 
pursued. 
b) Agricultural policy.  After  the  time  lags  sustained  by 
the  Community in the  sphere  of agriculture,  the  decisions 
taken at  the  end  of  1964  and  the  time-table laid  down  for 
the  decisions  to  be  taken  up  until  'i967,  made  it reason-
able  to  hope  that  on  the  date  proposed  by  the  Commission, 
the  common  agricultural policy,  one  of  the  essential  con-
ditions of  the  customs  union,  would  be  more  or less fi-
nal.  The  Council  hoped  that  there  would  be  no  cause  to 
amend  either the  decisions  taken  or  the  earlier provi-
sions,  despite  the  recent difficulties in financing  this 
common  agricultural policy.  Assuming  that  this went 
through  as planned,  the  Common·Market  would  call for  a 
major  technical  and  structural adjustment  drive both at 
the  production  and  processing stages  and  in marketing 
agricultural products. 
In order that the  agreement  reached  might be  beneficial 
to  the  French  economy  as  a  whole,  the  necessary  action 
should  be  taken  to  preclude  further imbalances. It would 
in particular be  advisaQle  as agricultural prices rose  -
a  rise  to  be  regarded  as necessary - that this  should  as 
far as possible,  be  compensated  for,  subject  to  more  de-
taile~ study,  by reductions in  the  indirect taxation  that 
should  become  possible  as  a  result of  the  common  agri-
cultural policy. 
c)  Trade  policy. Arriving at a  common  external  trade 
policy as  provided  for in  the  Treaty was  another of  the 
prere~uisites of  the  Customs  Union.  It fell  to  the  Com-
munity  to  expand  its trade with  countries  that had  dif-
ferent  economic  systems,  some  because  they were  under-
developed  and  had  low  living standards  and  others because 
their whole  economy  was  nationalized  and  had  a  greater 
concentration  of  technical  and  financial  resources.  Any 
disparity between national policies in  trade  relations 
with  third  countries would  create  an  unbearable  disorder 
in  the  Customs  Union.  Failing any  policy worked  out by 
joint agreement,  the  Customs  Union  would  preclude  the 
attainment of  the  purpose  of national policies;  even if 
the  ~uestion were  settled for agriculture,  in terms  of 
a  common  policy,  much  would  remain  to  be  done  for indus-
try. 
- 34  -The  Council  considered  that simply  to  liberalize  trade, 
which  to  take it to  the  extreme,  would  integrate  the  Com-
munity  in  a  North Atlantic free  trade  area,  would  be  un-
acceptable.  In  compliance  with  the  Treaty of Rome  the 
effects of increased  competition had  to  be  coupled with 
and  offset by  common  policy and  the harmonization meas-
ures  that  the  common  interest demanded. 
The  Council  recalled  the  need  for  joint action with re-
gard  to: 
i) duty rates  and  the  common  customs  tariff;  trade 
agreements with  third  countries; 
ii) quantitative  controls  on  imports;  safeguards against 
dumping  and  the  disorganization of markets;  credit, 
guarantees  and  other forms  of export  and  foreign 
investment assistance; 
iii) foreign investments in the  Common  Market. 
The  tariff negotiations  engaged  upon  under  GATT  at the 
initiative of the  United  States  to  reduce  customs duties, 
were  at present being  conducted  in  compliance with  the 
Treaty  on  behalf of  the  whole  Community.  ·The  Council re-
called  the  importance  that it attached: 
i) to  maintaining the  common  customs  tariff at a  suf-
ficiently high level  to  ensure  both  the  consolida-
tion of  the  Community  and  the  balance  of trade,  bea~ 
ing in mind  the  association agreements  made  with 
several  countries  and  the  special problems  of  the 
developing countries; 
ii) to  obtaining genuine  reciprocity on  tariff conces-
sions; it would  be  necessary  to  achieve  a  satisfac-
tory settlement of  the  question of  the  appreciable 
disparities between  the  Community  customs  tariff and 
those  of certain third  countries and  of  the  question 
of non-tariff obstacles  to  trade.  Failing this,  there 
would  be  no  counterpart  to  the  reductions sustained 
by  France  in addition  to  those  resulting from  apply-
ing the  common  customs  tariff; 
iii) to  satisfactory decisions being  taken  on  the  products 
to  be  excluded  from  the  negotiations; 
iv)  to  the  establishment of safeguard  clauses as ef-
fective  and  as  easy  to  put into  operation as  those 
available  to  certain foreign administrations. 
d)  Taxes.  The  Council noted  that  the  harmonization of 
turnover  taxes  and  of indirect taxation  throughout  the 
- 35  -Community  laid  down  in  the  Treaty,  was  now  being envis-
aged  along the  lines recommended  by France.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  measures  decided  upon  at the  national level in 
respect of direct  taxation with a  view  to  enabling French 
enterprises having  the  same  profits for distribution  to 
enjoy  the  same  investment opportunities as  their foreign 
competitors,  would  not  take  effect before  the  completion 
date  proposed  for  the  Customs  Union. 
e) Energy  and  trans¥ort.  The  Council  recalled  that al-
though  the  effect o  competitive  disparities between na-
tional  transport and  energy policies was  at present off-
set by  the  relative isolation of the  markets, it would 
be  fully felt when  the  Customs  Union  was  completed. 
With  regard  to  transport,  harmonization  could not  be  re-
stricted  to  competition but must  also  embrace  infra-
structure.  On  this point,  harmonization  depended  princi-
pally  on  decisions  to  be  taken by  France. 
f)  In more  general  terms,  the  finalization of  the  Customs 
Union  would  call for  an overall harmonization of economic 
and  financial policies within  the  Community.  Directly or 
indirectly,  the  public  authorities of  the Member  States 
at present ran  some  important branches of  the  economy 
and  brought pressure  to  bear on all the  others  through 
their social, agricultural,  trade, .fiscal, financial  and 
monetary policies, etc., not  to  mention  the  short-term 
economic  measures  they might  take.  This  was not without 
drawbacks.  Within  the  Customs  Union,  such diversity in 
the  way  in which  the  State  intervened  would  obviously 
create  intolerable  anomalies  and  disorder. 
Despite  opposition in  the  early stages,  real progress  had 
been  made  with regard  to  the  study  of  the  medium-term 
policy.  Yet  although it seemed  there  would  be  no  diffi-
culty in reaching an  agreement  on  overall  aims differ-
ences  of opinion remained  appreciable  on  methods  and  on 
the  implementing measures;  hence  the  agents  of  the  econo-
my  would  in fact  continue  to  be  subject  to  different 
policies- which had  its snags. 
In  conclusion,  the  Council noted  that while  progress  had 
been  made  in preparing for  the Economic  Union,  this still 
lagged  a  long way  behind  the  Customs  Union  in  terms  of 
its finalization.  As  things were  at present, it was  un-
able  to  return a  favourable  opinion  on bringing forward 
the  completion date  of  the  Customs  Union:  this would  only 
be  possible if the  measures  outlined  above  were  carried 
through. 
- 36  -It also  considered  that it was  not possible  to  continue 
in  the  present state of imbalance. 
The  Council was  concerned  to  see  that  the  Common  Market 
were  realized in full  and within  the  time-limits laid 
down  in the  Treaty,  and  recommended  that everything be 
done  without further delay  to implement  common  policies 
and  to  effect  the necessary harmonizations.  Lastly it 
recalled  the  need,  as  a  matter of priority,  to  increase 
efforts at the national level  to  improve  France's  com-
petitive position.  (Journal Officiel, Avis  et  ra~ports 
du Conseil  economique  et social,  27  January  1966) 
3.  Adapting  commercial  structures  to  the  Common  Market 
Mr.  P. Lebouleux,  Secretary-General  of  the  Committee  of 
Commercial Organizations in the  EEC  countries  and nation-
al adviser on  commerce,  wrote  an article  on  this subject 
in  "Les  cahiers de  l•ILEC"  ("Institut de  liaisons et 
d•etudes des industries  de  consommation" );  this was  re-
printed in the  review  "Problemes  economiques". 
''The  first consequence  of  the  Common  Market,"  wrote Mr. 
Lebouleux,  "has, in  the  main,  been  a  greater circulation 
of products,  facilitated by  the  phased  cuts in customs 
duties  and  the  abolition of quotas,  as  a  result of which 
a  wider range  of articles has been  made  available  to  the 
consumer.  This  has led,  on  the  one  hand,  to  a  certain in-
crease  in the  stocks kept  on  hand  and,  on  the  other,  to 
keener  competition. Experience  has  shown  the real effects 
of  the  latter  phenomenon,  for example,  with regard  to 
household  electric appliances,  footwear,  hosiery,  etc. 
Hence  French industry,  in particular, being subject  to 
substantial imports,  has  had  to  reconsider its policy 
and  its methods  and  adjust  to  the  new  situation- which 
it has  done  successfully. 
The  consequences in terms  of the  commercial  apparatus it-
self,  have  not as  yet been of real moment,  principally 
because  what is known  as  "freedom of establishment"  has 
only involved  the  elimination of restrictions contingent 
upon nationality and  because  decisions  have  been  taken 
only with regard  to  the  wholesale  trade  and  ancillary 
occupations,  a  draft decision  concerning  the  retail trade 
being under discussion." 
With regard  to  foreign  tradespeople  settling in France, 
- 37  -Mr.  Lebouleux noted  that despite  the  coming into  force 
of freedom  of establishment there  had  been no  change.  "It 
may  be  asked  whether  there will be  an  increase  when  the 
directive relating to  the  retail trade  comes  into appli-
cation;  this is probable  in  the  North,  the  North-East  and 
the Mediterranean which  already naturally constitute 
poles of attraction. It should  be  added  that foreign 
penetration is progressing in another way  which is not 
without  causing  some  concern:  the  purchase  of holdings 
in French enterprises which,  though minority holdings  at 
the  outset may  become  majority holdings  and  lead  to  these 
enterprises being absorbed." 
He  considered  that  the  differences in  company  law  slowed 
interpenetration;  this was  why  the  EEC  Commission  had 
proposed  various  approximations  and  why  in March  1965  the 
French  Government  had  itself submitted  to  the  EEC  a  note 
relating  to  the  creation of a  European  type  of  commercial 
enterprise. 
The  corollary to  the  implantation of foreign  tradespeople 
in France  was  the  installation of French  tradespeople  in 
the  partner countries.  In addition  to  the  reasons  re-
ferred  to,  which  constituted  "brakes",  there  were  others 
in France's  case.  Generally  speaking,  the  heads  of  French 
enterprises were  disinclined  to  settle abroad,  and,  more-
over,  the  substantial investments  that would  be  necessary 
implied  capital resources not available  to  them. 
''There  have,  however,  been  some  achievements.  This  is the 
case  in  the  wholesale  trade  where  sales networks  have 
been  set up  and  companies  floated  which  comprise  enter-
prises of several  countries; it is also  the  case  in  the 
mail  order business  and  in  the  sphere  of  consumer  co-
operatives,  the  latter endeavouring  to  introduce  special-
ization in their factories in  terms  of  the  Community. 
What  emerges with  _regard  to  adjusting  the  commercial 
apparatus is mainly modernization,  greater  space  and  in-
creased  warehousing facilities;  but  there  has  also  been 
a  "de-specialization"  of enterprises;  they are  offering 
an  increasing number  of products for sale;  this is due, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  a  natural  trend  already in evidence 
and,  on  the  other,  to  the  presentation of  foreign arti-
cles which,  furthermore, exercise  a  real attraction from 
the  standpoint of  the  customer.'' 
But  the  difficulties encountered,  Mr.  Lebouleux stressed, 
had  appeared  at two  levels.  The  first was  finance~ for 
the  resources available  were  insufficient for enterprises 
to  be  able  to  finance  themselves  and  recourse  to  the  fi-
- 38  -nancial market was  often  too  heavy  a  burden  and  the  means 
too  scarce.  Secondly,  difficulties had  arisen as follows: 
the  lack or inadequacy of training at the  staff or man-
agement levels.  Increasing the  size  of enterprises fur-
thermore  necessitated  "medium-level"  staff which  had  to 
be  trained. 
With  reference  to  the  efforts of  the  Common  Market  at  the 
consumer level, Mr.  Lebouleux wrote:  "There is no  doubt 
that  the  range  of articles on  sale,  from different  sour-
ces,  has been appreciated  by  the  consumer.  It is advis-
able  to  add,  however,  that  the  range  has not been widened 
as  much  as might  have  been  expected:  the  lack of harmo-
nization of laws relating to  products  (prosecution of 
malpractices;  laws  governing veterinary medicine;  mark-
ing and  packing;  technical rules  and  regulations,  etc.) 
has  be en prejudicial  to  the  expansion of trade." 
The  author  concluded  by  examining  the  adjustments  to  be 
made  by  commercial  enterprises.  "Let us  assume  firstly 
that  there will  and  secondly  that  there will not be  Com-
munity progress  throughout  the  economy.  If the  economy 
picks up,  the  constitution of a  single market by  1  July 
1967,  at least for agricultural products,  would  appear 
to  be  uncertain and  may  call for an  additional period  of 
time  equal  perhaps  to  the  transitional period laid  down 
by  the  Treaty.  In that case, it will be  easier for  com-
mercial  enterprises  to  adjust  themselves  provided  that 
certain brakes are  taken  off,  mainly in  the  sphere  of 
credit,  so  that raising  the  scale  of businesses  to  the 
European level may  go  forward  under  the best possible 
conditions and- in regard  to  staff training- so  that 
staff,  heads  of firms,  management  and  labour may  be  able 
to  carry out  the  tasks allotted  to  them.  This will,  how-
ever,  be  insufficient on its own.  Legislative  and  ad-
ministrative provisions,  which have  for decades isolated 
national markets  that  should  today  merge  into  a  single 
market,  will also  have  to  be  approximated.  The  necessary 
adjustments are,  in France at least,  beyond  the  scope  of 
the  heads  of firms.  It is essential that,  as is the  case 
in the  other Member  States,  the  professionals  should  be 
associated  in  the  studies and  work  involved in approxi-
mating laws  and  regulations. 
Disparities between  laws  can act as  a  brake  at least as 
effectively as  customs  duties or quotas  on  the  expansion 
of  trade,  as is amply  borne  out by  such examples  as  "teclr 
nical obstacles"  and  health regulations.  There will also 
have  to  be  a  European law,  identical in application in 
the  six countries,  and  covering bankruptcy,  company  stat-
utes,  indirect and  direct taxation,  price legislation and 
- 39  -competition rules. 
If we  assume  there  will be  no  recovery  or  that this will 
be  held  back,  there is no  doubt  that  the  heads  of  com-
mercial  enterprises will,  like  those  in other sectors, 
either hesitate  or fail  to  pursue  the  efforts that their 
professional  organizations  and  the  public  authorities 
have  encouraged  them  to  make,  often at heavy  cost. In 
any  event,  any  regression  to  the  status  ~uo ante  would 
appear  to  be  inconceivable.  The  results achieved  with 
regard  to  the  free  movement  of products  (customs  duties 
and  ~uotas) can not be  called into  ~uestion.  The  compe-
tition of foreign  suppliers will  continue  and  since  com-
merce  can  only flourish if the  other  sectors  (agricul-
ture,  industry)  do  so  too, it is essential  that adjust-
ments  be  made,  perhaps  at  a  different rate,  although  this 
implies  a  danger in  the  event  of  a  subse~uent recovery, 
perhaps with different imperatives  although the  finality 
remains  the  same:  the  former  concept  of structure  and 
scale  of  markets is out of date,  a  larger scale will  have 
to  be  found."  (Problemes  economi~ues,  3  February  1966) 
- 40  -III.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
1.  Developments  regarding  the United Kingdom's  entry into 
the  Common  Market 
Between  December  1965  and  February 1966  a  number  of Brit-
ish statesmen  and  industrialists expressed their views  on 
the prospect  of  the  United Kingdom's  entering the  Common 
Market.  Highlights  from  their statements  are  reproduced 
below  in the  following  sequence:  an  article by JohnDavies, 
Director-General  of  the  Confederation of  British Industry; 
the  views  expressed  by  "The  Times",  by Mr.  Heath,  Leader 
of  the  Opposition,  and  by  Mr.  Soames,  Shadow Foreign Secre-
tary,  and  statements  to  the  House  by  the  Foreign Secretary 
and  Prime  Minister.  Also  reproduced  are  significant passa-
ges  from  speeches  by Lord  Gladwyn  and Sir Con  O'Neill, 
Head  of  the  European Affairs  Department,  Foreign Office, 
which merit  special attention.  Further developments  in 
connexion with Britain's entry  into  the  Common  Market will 
be  reported  on  in the  next  issue  of  this bulletin. 
The  December  issue  of  the  "EFTA  Bulletin",  published in 
Geneva,  contains  an article by  John  Davies,  Director-
General  of  the  Confederation of British Industry,  on  eco-
nomic  relations  between the United  Kingdom  and  the  EEC. 
Mr.  Davies  points  out  that  the  Common  Market  has  given 
further  impetus  to  the  evolutionary changes  already taking 
place  in the pattern of British trade.  The  abortive nego-
tiations for  British entry into  the  EEC  served not  only to 
heighten British industry's  awareness  of  the  immense  po-
tential of  the  EEC  markets  but  also  forced it to  reappnrlse 
its trading policies  and  methods  vis-R-vis  the  Community. 
As  a  result Britain has  turned  more  and  more  to  Europe, 
both as  a  source  of  imports  and  as  a  market  for  exports. 
Turning to  the present crisis in the  Common  Market, 
Mr.  Davies writes  that this is  of  crucial importance not 
only for  the Six but  for their trading partners the world 
over  since  "any serious  check  to  the  momentum  of  the  EEC 
not  only sets back yet  again the  long-deferred hope  of 
eventual  European  integration but  threatens  the  continued 
expansion  of world  trade that the  emergence  of  the  Commu-
nity itself has  done  so  much  to  stimulate in recent years." 
Mr.  Davies  stresses that it will be  the  conscious  task of 
the  Confederation of  British Industry to  look  at every 
possible way  that might  lead to  a  solution of the  problem 
of British integration.  Even  if existing circumstances 
seem to  offer little prospect  of  an  early settlement, it 
- 41  -would  be  fatal not  to  go  on  working  towards  this  end  with 
vigour  and  determination.  The  C.B.I.  in fact  hopes  shortly 
to  launch into  a  major  exercise with this  in view. 
The  preliminary work  of  the  C.B.I.  on  the  development  of 
the  EEC,  ECSC  and  Euratom  and  the practical implications 
of Britain's eventual  entry into  the  Common  Market  has 
now  been  concluded.  The  survey is  along  the  following 
lines: 
The  first phase  covers  the  practical  and  legislative 
effects  on  policy in the  economic,  taxation,  employment, 
social,  commercial,  transport  and  energy sectors.  Special 
studies  are  made  of  problems  peculiar  to  coalmining,  the 
iron and  steel industry and  agriculture.  These  concentrate 
mainly  on  sectors  exhibiting outstanding  advantages  or 
disadvantages. 
In the  second  phase  the  Council  of  the  C.B.I.  is  to  hold 
discussions with industry in the  light of  these  reports. 
It is  hoped  in this way  to  reach agreement,  early in1967, 
on  an  overall policy which  can  be  regarded  as  reflecting 
the  views  on  this  subject  entertained in industrial 
circles. 
On  4  January 1966,  in  an  article entitled 
11Where  Does 
Britain Stand?
11
,  the  European  Economic  Correspondent  of 
"The  Times"  observes  that 
11the  question  of British member-
ship  of  the  Common  Market  has  become  a  live  issue  again. 
It has  taken  a  crisis in the  Common  Market  which  threat-
ened its very  existence  for  this  to  happen.  But it has. 
The  consequence  is that,Britain must  be  ready,  when  the 
time  comes,  to  act. 11  After briefly outlining  the  EEC 
crisis,  the  article  goes  on: 
11 The  Five  have  been beginning 
to  think what  to  do  if France  was  finally bent  on  wrecking 
the  Community.  To  suppose  that Britain could  spring into 
the  empty  chair left by France,  as  it were  by  a  ~onjuring 
trick,  is absurd.  The  new  Europe  cannot  be built without 
France,  for  obvious  reasons.  But  - if it had  to  go  on for 
a  little time,  while  waiting for France  - the  crucial 
point would  arrive  when  the  Five  felt  they had  to  take 
decisions by themselves.  They  have  studiously avoided 
doing  so,  but  a  prolonged  absence  by France  would  force 
their hand.  It is  at this  moment  that the  Five  might  very 
well invite Britain to  rejoin  them  in Brussels  - the  nego-
tiations never  having been  formally  suspended,  only inter-
rupted.11 
At  a  press  conference  given at the  headquarters  of  the 
Foreign Press  Association in Rome  on  21  January 1966, 
Mr.  Heath,  Leader  of  the  Opposition,  stated that if his 
- 42  -· party were  returned to  power,  it would  seize  any favour-
able  opportunity to  get Britain into  the  Common  Market. 
By  a 
11favourable  opportunity"  he  implied  the desire  of-
the Six to  accept Britain in the  Community.  Mr.  Heath 
added  that the  Conservative proposals,  which suggest cer-
tain technical  changes  in the EEC's  agricultural policy, 
and  the  agreements  concluded between  the  EEC  and  a  number 
of  Commonwealth  countries,  had  removed  many  of  the  obsta-
cles  to  Britain's entry existing in January 1963.  This 
view was  borne  out  in a  talk he  had  held with President 
de  Gaulle  last December. 
During the  two-day  meeting held between  the British 
Federal Trust for Education  and  Research  and  the  "Britain 
in Europe"  Movement,  Mr.  Heath put  forward  a  rather pessi-
mistic  analysis  of  the  situation.  He  saw  no  prospects  of 
Britain's entering the  Common  Market  before  the  close  of 
the transition period  of  the  EEC  at  the  end  of  1970.  He 
had  hoped  that  a  favourable  opportunity might  present it-
self in 1968 but it seemed unlikely now  that this would 
be  the  case.  Earlier entry was  completely out  of  the 
question,  although this  appeared  to  have  been  forgotten 
in the  meantime. 
On  17  January 1966  Mr.  Christopher Soames,  Conservative 
spokesman  on  Foreign Affairs,  told  the  Anglo-Belgian 
Society in Brussels that Britain was  again ready  and 
willing to  enter the Common  Market.  Europe  withoutBritain 
was  in the  long run  as  unthinkable  as  Europe  without 
France.  The  Six should constantly bear the  problem of 
Britain's relations with the  EFTA  countries  in mind,  and 
Britain should  show  evidence  of its desire  to  enter the 
Common  Market  and  of its willingness to  accept  the prin-
ciples  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  As  far back  as  1961  the  Conserv-
ative  Government  had  expressed  approval  of  the  majority 
vote  system in the  Council  and  of  the political independ-
ence  of  the  EEC  Commission.  No  change  in this  attitude 
had  since  taken place.  Turning  to  recent  statements  by 
the Foreign Secretary,  Mr.  Stewart,  Mr.  Soames  felt that, 
given  good will,  negotiations  on  Britain's entry into  the 
Common  Market  would  prove  easier  than  a  few  years  ago. 
The  importance  of  economic  relations with  the  Commonwealth 
countries had  since  diminished  and  the  Commonwealth  itself 
realized that Britain's future  now  lay in Europe. 
In a  statement  to  the  House  on  21  December  1965, 
Mr.  Stewart said that Great Britain was  ready and willing 
to  enter the  Common  Market  provided  that certain British 
interests were  taken into account.  He  added  that  conside~ 
able difficulties still remained,  particularly in the 
agricultural sector.  Asked  by  a  Liberal  Member  whether 
- 43  -agriculture represented  in the  eyes  of  the  Labour  Govern-
ment  the  main  obstacle  to  Britain's entry,  he  declined to 
list the  obstacles in order  of difficulty but  admitted 
that agriculture was  one  of  the  thorniest problems  that 
had  to be  faced. 
Speaking at the  meeting  of  the  Federal  Trust  for  Education 
and  Research earlier referred to  on  "Britain and  the 
European  Community",  Mr.  Stewart  stated that  Britain was 
ready  to  enter into  new  negotiations provided  that its 
essential interests were  safeguarded.  He  dealt in particu-
lar with  the  previous  negotiations between  the  Conserva-
tive  Government  and  the  EEC  and  added  that he  believed 
that with  good  will  and  patience  on both sides  the diffi-
culties  surrounding Britain's entry into  the  Community 
could  be  overcome  if negotiations  were  resumed.  These  dif-
ficulties nevertheless  remained  and  some  of  them  were  con-
siderable.  If,  for  example,  the  common  agricultural  policy 
in its present  form  were  considered,  then  from  the  British 
point  of  view it probably presented  the  biggest  obstacle. 
If Britain had  to  accept  this policy unchanged,  it would 
clearly have  adverse  effects  on  her balance  of  payments 
and  on  the  cost  of  living. 
Britain's policy,  as  had  already been  explained,  consisted 
in being ready to  enter into negotiations  for  accession to 
the  European  Economic  Community,  provided  that  she  secured 
satisfactory conditions  and  that her  essential interests 
were  safeguarded,  just as  the  six Member  States  of  the 
Community  protected their various  essential interests when 
they  took  on  the  immense  task of  drawing  up  the  Treaty  of 
Rome. 
Britain was  open  to  new  ideas  and  would  interpret  the 
basic conditions  that  had  been presented  to  her in the 
light of  facts.  Some  of  these  conditions  had  changed  since 
they had first been  formulated  in that  they were  now 
easier to fulfil. 
There  was  therefore  no  hesitation  on Britain's part pro-
vided  that satisfactory ways  of protecting her interests 
and  those  of  her  EFTA  and  Commonwealth  partners were 
found,  and  that  the  Community  was  willing. 
Britain was  therefore  ready  and willing to  enter  the  Euro-
pean  Economic  Community. 
Stewart  wound  up  with  a  reference  to  the  easing in tension 
between Eastern  and  Western Europe.  He  pointed  out  in par-
ticular that  one  of  the  prime  prerequisites for  a  continu-
ation of  this process  was  political  and  economic  cohesion 
- ~  -in Western Europe. 
On  the  same  occasion Mr.  Luns,  Dutch Foreign Minister, 
had  hinted that  the  Five  and.Britain could  perhaps  arrive 
at  a  political  arrangement  - a  suggestion which both the 
Opposition  and  the  Labour  Government  refused  to  consider. 
Mr.  Heath  only agreed with Mr.  Luns  that  the  present  EEC 
crisis  should  not  lead to  a  cleavage.  Lord  Gladwyn,  who 
also  took part in the discussion,  urged  that Britain 
should  enter the  Common  Market,  a  view  forcefully 
expressed  by  him  in his  recently published book  "The 
European Idea". 
During  a  debate  held in the  House  of  Commons  on  10  Febru-
ary 1966  on  the  possibility of  Britain's entering the 
Common  Market,  Mr.  Wilson  remarked  that Mr.  Stewart's 
statement  that Britain would  be  ready  and willing to  join, 
provided  her  essential interests were  safeguarded,  reflec-
ted  the  official policy of  his  Government.  He  referred to 
the unacceptability of  the Six's agricultural policy in 
its existing form  and  dwelt  on  the  need  to  secure  good 
conditions  for Britain's entry.  Mr.  Heath  asked  Mr.  Wilson 
for  a  declaration  of  intent confirming that his  Government 
accepted  the  Rome  Treaty  and  the development  of  the  common 
agricultural policy,  as  otherwise all the  PrimeMinister's 
statements  would  be  meaningless.  Mr.  Wilson  thereupon 
accused  the  Leader  of  the  Opposition  of  advocating  the 
conditionless  entry of  Great Britain into  the  Community, 
adding that  he  had  repeatedly warned  that  the  common  agri-
cultural policy in its existing form,  and  perhaps  even 
more  in its future  form,  would  adversely affect British 
interests,  cost  of  imports,  the  cost  of  living and  Common-
wealth  trade. 
Mr.  Jo  Grimond,  Liberal  Leader,  then  asked Mr.  Wilson 
whether  Mr.  Gaitskell's five  conditions still held  good. 
Mr.  Wilson replied that  they still applied,  although  some 
were  now  easier to fulfil than three years  ago  - for 
example  British interests vis-e-vis the  other  EFTA  coun-
tries.  In  a  subsequent  exchange,  Mr.  Heath  stressed that 
the  conditions  laid down  by Mr.  Wilson  made  any discusswn 
with the  Community  impossible.  Mr.  Wilson  thereupon in-
sisted that there was  only  one  overriding consideration, 
that is, that British interests should be  safeguarded,  and 
reproached  Mr.  Heath for not  having  ignored  the effects 
his  demands  would  have,  particularly in the  agricultural 
sector. 
In an  address  delivered in Paris,  Lord  Gladwyn,  Liberal, 
suggested  that  only if Britain entered  the  Common  Market 
could  the  other  EEC  partners  avoid  a  hegemony  of  the 
- 45  -Federal Republic  of  Germany.  In addition,  Britain would 
have  to  discard  any illusion that it was  still economi-
cally a  world  power.  Only by direct union with  an  immense 
trading bloc  - he  added  - could Britain acquire  power  and 
influence  throughout  the  world.  In  a  speech delivered at 
Hamburg,  Lord  Gladwyn  mentioned  the  following  factors  in 
connexion with  a  new  approach  by Britain to  the  EEC:  the 
decline  of  the  Commonwealth,  increasing trade with the 
EEC,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  Atlantic Alliance  which 
must  regard  a  united  and  powerful  Europe  as  America's 
partner.  He  stood  for European  union but  rejected  a  loose 
federation of national States which,  he  felt,  would 
swiftly lead  to  a  form  of  nationalistic  anarchy  fromwhich 
only  the  Soviet  Union would  profit.  In  an  address  given 
at Oxford  in early January before  600  representatives  of 
British agriculture,  Lord  Gladwyn  remarked  that if the 
Common  Market  continued  in existence it would  one  day 
become  a  homogeneous  political whole.  It would  then be 
difficult for  Britain to  draw  any  advantage  from its 
position of  isolation.  The  Western Alliance  would  accord-
ingly be  based  on  the  links between  the  United States  and 
Europe,  and  Britain would  become  either an  isolatedisland 
forced  to  withdraw  into itself,  or  a  satellite of  the 
United States. 
Similar views  were  recently expressed by Sir  Con  O'Neill, 
Deputy  Under-Secretary~f-State, Foreign Office,  in  an 
address  entitled 
11Britain's place  in Europe"  to  the  Bene-
lux Co-operation  Committee  in  The  Hague  on  14  January196~ 
Salient passages  from  this  address  are  published  in the 
February  number  of 
11 The  World  Today".  The  speaker  stated 
at  the  outset  that in the  field  of  defence,  at least, 
Britain knew  she  needed  the  rest  of  Western  Europe  and 
the rest  of  Western  Europe  knew it needed  Britain.  Close 
collaboration was  taking place  on  defence  but  more  prog-
ress  had  to  be  made  in the political field.  The  European 
idea was  steadily gaining  ground  in Britain,  particularly 
among  the  younger  people. 
Sir  Con  O'Neill went  on  to  refer to  two  problems:  the 
so-called British 
11special relationship"  with  the  USA  and 
the  problem  of  "supranationality
11
•  Some  people  outside 
Britain believed the British were  determined  to  cling 
exclusively to  that relationship  and  were  therefore re-
luctant  to  commit  themselves  fully  to  Europe.  Whether 
Britain's relationship  was  "special"  he  did  not  know, 
but it was  certainly important  and  would  remain  so.  The 
kind of  Europe  contemplated in Britain would  be  a  partner, 
not  a  rival,  of  the  United States.  Turning  to  the  problem 
of  "supranationality",  Sir  Con  O'Neill pointed  out  that 
every international relationship affects  sovereignty  and 
- 46  -that exaggerated national independence  is ineffective. 
Should Britain ever  succeed in joining the  Community, 
she  might well be  found  to be  the  champion rather than 
the  opponent  of its "supranational aspects". 
Sir Con  O'Neill went  on  to  say that  the  problems  of the 
"special relationship
11  with the  USA  and  "supranationality" 
seemed  less important  to  him  than they were  sometimes  said 
to be.  More  difficult were  those  connected with external 
trade,  agriculture  and  the  Commonwealth.  The  structure  of 
British foreign  trade  had  made  it more  difficult for 
Britain than for  the  six Member  States of the  Community, 
ten years  ago,  to  think mainly in European  terms,  and 
still did  today,  though decreasingly so.  By  1964,  the 
picture  had  changed.  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  had be-
come  major  markets for Britain.  The  Community  market  had 
now  become  a  most  important  one,  particularly as it was 
an  area in which Britain had  a  favourable  balance  of 
trade. 
Another difficulty was  the  Community's  agricultural poltcy. 
Although  agriculture was  also  an  important branch of 
British industry,  Britain had  to  import  large  quantities 
of  food  at world  trade prices.  If the  EEC's  agricultural 
policy were  adopted,  it would  inevitably lead to  a  rise 
in Britain's cost of  living and  industrial .costs.  The 
common  agricultural policy was  based  largely on  the  inter-
ests  of  countries  that  are  surplus  producers.  This  did not 
mean  that Britain could never  accept  the  Common  Market's 
agricultural policy,  difficult  though  such  a  decision 
would  be. 
The  third of  the  three  main difficulties was  the  Common-
wealth.  Although  the position regarding  commercial 
arrangements  had  to  some  extent  changed,  Britain was  still 
deeply involved in Arabia,  in South East Asia  and  in 
Africa,  and  this  gave  her  thinking  a  different  slant. 
Towards  the  end  of his  address,  Sir  Con  O'Neill  quoted 
the  statements  made  by Mr.  Stewart  in December  ("The 
Government  are  ready  and  willing to  join the  EEC  ~rovided 
that essential British interests are  safeguarded"),  by 
Mr.  Wilson  ("Our ultimate  aim is a  common  European  market 
embracing Britain and  as  many  European  countries  as  are 
prepared to  join")  and  Mr.  Padley  ("The  five  conditions 
will be  interpreted pragmatically in the realities of 
1965-6-7-8").  The  Government -he went  on- would  like to 
se~ a  wider  European unity,  which partook  more  of  the 
nature  of  EEC  than  of  EFTA.  When  the  moment  came  for 
Britain to  join the  European  Community,  it could not  be 
expected  to  take  over  every  comma  of the  Treaty.  The  Rome 
- 47  -Treaty  had  come  into being  through  tough bargaining and 
compromises  over national interests.  If negotiations for 
Britain's entry were  resumed,  they would  have  to be  con-
ducted  on  a  down-to-earth basis.  The  six Member  States  of 
the  Community  had  themselves  had  to  take  difficult deci-
sions which would  have  been  impossible without  compromises 
and  understanding  on all sides.  The  Six would  therefore 
have  to  endeavour  to  take  account  of  Britain's essential 
interests in the  same  way.  (Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung, 24.12.6~ 
23.1.66,  12.2.66;  Le  Monde,  28.1.66;  Die  Welt,  4.1.66, 
4.2.66;  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  28.1.66;  Industr~ 
kurier,  27.1.66;  John  Davies,  "The  Importance  of  the  EEC 
Market  to  EFTA  countries",  in EFTA  Bulletin,  Vol.  VI, 
No.  8,  December  1965;  Sir Con  O'Neill,  "Britain's Place 
in Europe",  in The  World  Today,  Vol.  22,  No.2,  February 
1966) 
2.  EFTA  parliamentarians discuss  the  EEC  crisis 
On  the  eve  of  the  meeting  of  the  Consultative Assembly  of 
the  Council  of  Europe  on  23  January  1966,  a  number  of par-
liamentarians  from  the  EFTA  countries  gathered in Stras-
bourg  for  a  discussion  opened  by  Mr.  Duncan  Sandys  (Con-
servative). 
Mr.  Duncan  Sandys  said at the  outset:  "The  EFTA  countries 
can~ot wish  that  the  EEC  institutions  should  emerge  from 
the crisis in  a  weakened  position."  In reply to  the  ques-
tion what  was  EFTA's  a~titude to  the  crisis,  Mr.  Sandys 
stated that tact would  have  to  be  shown  although  one could 
not  remain  entirely passive.  A  positive development  of 
the  EEC  was  in  any  case  important  as  the  future  of  free 
Europe  as  a  whole  depended  on it. He  ruled  out  the  possi-
bility of  EFTA  and  the  EEC  undergoing parallel develop-
ment;  if the  crisis was  surmounted,  it would  be  the  psy-
chological  moment  for  broadening  the  EEC  and  for  agree-
ments  on political co-operation. 
Should  the  door  of  the  EEC  open,  EFTA  members  would  join 
the  Common  Market  individually or collectively and  the 
Community  system  of  the  EEC  including  the  principle  of 
qualified majorities would  have  to  be  adopted. 
The  views  of  Mr.  Duncan  Sandys  were  not  shared by  those 
present who  felt  that  a  more  cautious  attitude  should  be 
adopted  towards  the  EEC  crisis.  Mr.  Geoffrey  de  Freitas 
(Labour),  in particular,  advocated  a  policy of wait-and-
see.  Mr.  Karl  Czernetz  (Austria)  hoped  that  the  crisis 
- 48  -would  soon be  over  so  that his country's negotiations in 
Brussels  could be  pushed  ahead with.  Mr.  Torstein Selvik 
(Conservative,  Norway)  stated that  two  problems  lay behind 
the crisis:  that  of  financing  agriculture  and  that  of 
choosing between  a  federation  of States  or  a  federal 
State.  Mr.  Maurice  Edelman  (Labour)  felt that  caution 
should be  exercised  since  General  de  Gaulle  co~d not  be 
expected  to  make  concessions  regarding the  powers  of  the 
Commission if one  was  oneself not  prepared  to  make  them. 
Mr.  Per Federspiel  (Liberal,  Denmark)  dwelt  on relations 
between the  EEC  and  EFTA  and  stressed that  the  progressive 
abolition of  customs  barriers within the  two  trading blocs 
would  lead to  a  constant  widening  of  the  gap  between  them. 
He  therefore  suggested that  customs  dismantlement  in the 
two  areas  should  be  structurally approximated  so  as  not 
to  undermine  future  prospects. 
The  general  view was  that  EFTA  should  strengthen its or-
ganization  and  steer gradually in the direction of  the 
EEC.  In this connexion,  Mr.  John  Colson,  the  newSecretar~ 
General,  pointed  out  that  so far  no  response  had  been 
received  from  the  EEC  to  proposals  for  fresh  talks with 
EFTA.  (Neue  Zurcher  Zeitung,  25  January 1966) 
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PARLIAMENTARY ACTIltrT TY
I.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Activities  of the Comnittees in  February
Political-  Comnittee (1)
Meeting of  111 February 1n Brussels: In the presence of representatives of the commissions of the EEC and EAEO
as werl as of the High Authority of the Ecsc, examination of the present position of the communities  with particular
reference to:
a) the concrusions  d-rawn from the extraord.inary  meetings of the Council of Minlsters hel-d. on 17 and 18 and Zd
and 29 January 1966;
b) the conclusions d.rawn from the "col-roquy'r between the Parliament, the Councils and the Executives of
20 January 1966.
Appointment  of a Rapporteur for  the preparation of  a report on the present situation of the Conmunities.
iVl.eeting -of 28 February in Paris: Perusal and adoption of the d.raft of a report on the present situatlon oi  the
Communities. Rapporteur: Mr. Metzger.
External  Trad.e Committee (2)
Meeting of-1l  February in  Prussels: Report by Mr. Rey
ent iregotiltions  between the comnunity and certain non-member countries. rn the presence of a representative of the Ecsc commission, perusal and. adoption of the d.raft of a report by
51Tl'lr.  Bading  on  the  proposal  for  a  regulation concerning  a 
common  definition of the  origin of  goods.  In the  presence 
of  a  representative  of  the  EEC  Commission,  perusal  and 
adoption  of  the  draft  of  a  report  by Mr.  Vredeling  on the 
proposal  for  a  regulation concerning the  gradual intro-
duction of  a  joint  procedure  for  the  administration of 
~uantitative import  Quotas  in the  Community. 
Agricultural  Committee  (3) 
Meeting  of  15  and  16  February in Brussels:  Exchange  of 
views  on  the  draft  EEC  budget  for  1966  and  approval  of  a 
note  to  be  discussed between  a  delegation from  the  Agri-
cultural Committee  and  the  Budget  and  Administration 
Committee.  Examination  and  approval  of  a  draft  Opinion 
by  Mr.  Briot,  to  be  referred  to  the  Internal Market  Com-
mittee  on  a  directive  establishing the  machinery for  en-
acting freedom  of  establishment  and  the  freedom  to  supply 
services in n6n-wage-earning activities in the  forestry 
sector  and  on  an  amendment  to  the  Council's  general  pro-
gramme  for  eliminating restrictions  on  freedom  of estab-
lishment. 
Social  Committee  (4) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~B~r~u~s~s~e~l~s:  Adoption  of  the 
draft  report  by  Mr.  Sabatini 
and  the  draft  resolution  on  the  draft  EEC  Commission 
recommendation  to  develop vocational  guidance. 
Examination  and  adoption  of  a  draft report  by Mr.Sabatini 
on  the  occupational  training policy aspect  of  the  action 
programme  with  special  reference  to  agriculture. 
Examination  of the  finalized  EEC  Commission report  on  the 
action taken pursuant  to  the  recommendation  concerning 
the  work  of the  social  services  on behalf  of workers 
changing their residence within the  Community;  report 
examined  in conjunction with the  working  paper  on this 
subject  by  Mr.  Carcaterra and  appointment  of Mr.Carcaterra 
as "Rapporteur. 
- 52  -Meeting  of  16  February in Brussels:  Adoption  of  a  draft 
report  by Mr.  Carcaterra on  the  action taken by  the 
Member  States pursuant  to  the  recommendation  on social 
services for migrant  workers. 
Appointment  of Mr.  Bersani  as Rapporteur  on the  draft 
Council regulation amending  and  amplifying Regulations 
Nos.3  and  4  on social security for migrant  workers  (sea-
men). 
Preliminary  examination of  a  draft Council regulation on 
the  application of social security systems  to wage-earners 
and  their families  changing their residence within the 
Community  and  appointment  of Mr.  Troclet  as Rapporteur  on 
this subject. 
Internal Market  Committee  (5) 
Meeting of  1  February in Brussels:  Examination at  a  meet-
ing attended by  EEC  Commission representatives  of  a  draft 
Opinion by Mr.  Armengaud  to  be  referred to  the  External 
Trade  Committee  on the  definition of the  origin of  goods; 
vote  taken on this Opinion. 
Resumption of the  study of  competition problems  and  of 
the  position of the  European enterprise in the  Common 
Market  and in relation to world  economic  developments; 
meeting attended  by representatives  of the  High Authority 
and  the  EEC  Commission.  Rapporteur:  Mr.  Kapteyn. 
Meeting  of  8  February in Brussels:  Examination,  at  a 
meeting attended by representatives  of  the  EEC  Commissio~ 
of  the  draft directive  designed  to  co-ordinate  the  guar-
antees required in Member  States  from  companies  and  firms 
(as  defined in Article  58,2  of the  EEC  Treaty)  to protect 
the  interests both  of  members  and third parties,  the 
object  being to make  them equivalent. 
Economic  and Financial Committee  (6) 
Meeting  of  17  February in Brussels:  Discussion,  at  a  meet-
ing attended by Mr.  Marjolin,  Vice-President  of  the  EEG 
- 53  -Commission,  on  the  draft  report  by Mr.  Kriedemann  on the 
Commission  survey  of  the  economic  situation in the  Commu-
nity.  Mr.  De  Winter  appointed drafter for  a  Committee 
Opinion,  to  be  referred to  the  Internal Market  Committee, 
on the  rules  of  competition and  on  the  position of Euro-
pean enterprises in relation to  the  Common  Market  and  to 
world  economy. 
Meeting  of  28  February in Brussels:  Adoption  of  a  draft 
report  by  Mr.  Kriedemann  on  the  Commission  survey  of  the 
economic  situation in the  Community. 
Committee  for  Co-operation with Developing Countries  (7) 
Meeting  of  11  February in Brussels:  Appointment  of  a 
Rapporteur  on Euratom's relations with developing  coun-
tries.  Appointment  of  a  Rapporteur  on the  ECSC's  rela-
tions with the  developing  countries.  Perusal  and  adoption 
of the  draft  report  by Mr.  Metzger  on the results  of the 
second  meeting  of  the  Parliamentary Conference  of  the 
Association.  Discussion with the  EEC  Commission  on the 
present  situation of  the  Community  as  regards  the  Asso-
ciation and  relations with other  developing countries. 
First  exchange  of views,  in the  presence  of  the  EEC  Com-
mission,  on  problems  of technical  and  cultural co-opera-
tion in the  Association  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Moro) 
Meeting  of  25  February in Luxembourg:  Discussion of the 
problem of keeping  the Associated States  informed  on  the 
activities of the  European Parliament  on  behalf  of  the 
Association.  Perusal  and  adoption,  in the  presence  of 
the  EEC  Commission,  of  the  draft report  by Mr.  Moro  on 
current  problems  connected with technical  and  cultural 
co-operation in the  Association. 
Transport  Committee  (8) 
Meeting  of  3  February in Brussels:  Exchange  of views  with 
Mr;  Schaus,  member  of the  Commission,  on the  application 
of  the  rules  of  competition to  transport  and  on  an  enquiry 
into  the  structure  of the  transport  market.  Mr.  Brunhes 
- 54  -appointed Rapporteur  on the  draft regulation for abolish-
ing discrimination on transport  prices  and  conditions. 
First exchange  of views  with  the  Commission  on this draft 
regulation. 
Energy Committee  (9) 
Meeting  of  28  February in Brussels:  Information reports 
on the  energy policy developments  in the various Member 
States,  with particular reference  to  the  energy policy 
measures  of the  Governments  in favour  of  coalmines.  First 
debate  on the indicative European  energy situation 1965-
66  of the High Authority.  Debate  on the  policy planned 
by  the  EEC  Commission for hydrocarbons.  Resumption  of 
the  debate  on the  indicative  progra~ of  the  Euratom 
Commission  (Article  40  of  the  EAEC  Treaty).  Debate  on 
the  aspects  of  coal processing in the light  of  a  note 
from the  General Directorate for Coal  of the  High Autho-
rity. 
Research and Cultural Affairs Committee  (10) 
Meeting  of  3  February in Brussels:  In the  presence  of 
Mr.  Sardo,  Director of,the European School at Brussels, 
as well as representatives  of the  Parents'  Committee, 
and  of  the  three  Communities,  at  the  Council  of the 
European Schools,  perusal  and  adoption of the  draft 
report  drawn up  by Mr.  Merten  on the  establishment  of 
European Schools leading to  the High School  diploma. 
Meeting of  22  February in Brussels:  In the  presence  of 
representatives  of  the  EEC  Commission  and  of  the  Euratom 
Commission,  discussion on  the  draft resolution by Mrs. 
Strobel relating to  the  creation of  a  European youth 
project  (Rapporteur:  Mr.  Scarascia-Mugnozza).  Perusal 
and  adoption of the  draft report  by Mr.  Bernasconi  on 
the  creation of  a  European sports diploma. 
- 55  -Health Protection Committee  (11) 
Meeting  of  15  February in Brussels:  Exchange  of views 
with the  Euratom Commission  on health protection at  the 
nuclear research establishments in Community  countries in 
the light  of the  recent  accident  at  the  Mol  Research 
Centre  in Belgium. 
Exchange  of views  with  the  EEC  Commission  on its report 
on the  implementation of  the  recommendation it addressed 
to  the  Member  States in 1962  on health and  safety at  work; 
Mr.  Bernasconi  appointed Rapporteur  on this  subject. 
Perusal,  at  a  meeting attended by  EEC  Commission repre-
sentatives,  of  two  draft  recommendations  relating to: 
a)  a  Community  definition of the  degree  of invalidity 
required to  qualify for benefits; 
b)  maternity protection; 
and  appointment  of Mrs.  Gennai-Tonietti  as Rapporteur  on 
these  two  draft  recommendations. 
Budget  and Administration Committee  (12) 
Meeting  of  25  January in Luxembourg:  Exchange  of views 
with  the  EEC  and  Euratom Councils  on the  draft  budgets 
for  1966.  Resumption  of  the  study  of  budgetary proposals 
for  1966  at  a  meeting attended by  representatives  of  the 
EEC  and  Euratom  Commissions. 
Examination  of  and  approval  of the  draft report  by Mr.  de 
Gryse  on  the  draft  operating budget  of  the  EEC  for  1966. 
Examination  and  approval  of  the  draft report  by Mr. 
Battaglia on the  draft  operating budget  and  the  draft 
research and  investment  budget  of  Euratom for  1966. 
Legal  Committee  (13) 
Meeting  of  10  February in Brussels:  Mr.  Deringer elected 
Chairman to  succeed Mr.  Weinkamm.  Examination and 
approval  of  the  report  by Mr.  Bech  and  appointment  of 
- 56  -deputies  on the  Committees  (amendment  of Articles  37,2 
and  40,3  of the Rules  of Procedure). 
- 57  -II.  NATIONAL  PARLIAMENTS 
a)  France 
The  paramountcy  of Community  law 
Respect  for  the  paramountcy  of Community  law  on  the  part 
of  the  French  judiciary was  the  subject of  a  written 
question addressed  to  the Minister of Justice  by Mr. 
Spenale  (Socialist).  In this connexion,  he  put  a  number 
of  questions  to  the Minister  on  the  information available 
to national  judges  concerning Community  decisions  and  on 
the  directives issued  to  them to  ensure  respect for  the 
paramountcy  of Community  law  and  for  the  procedure  govern-
ing applications for preliminary rulings laid down  in the 
EEC  Treaty. 
In reply,  the Minister pointed out  that:  a)  Community 
decisions having general ·application throughout  the  Six 
are  published in the Official Gazette  of the  European 
Communities.  French courts  may  without  difficulty obtain 
copies,  in French,  of this publication from  the  Gazette's 
sales  and  subscriptions  office in Paris.  Many  Community 
texts,  furthermore,  are  issued as  administrative  or pri-
vate  publications  and  are  easily obtainable;  b)  it is not 
customary  for  the  chancellery systematically to  issue 
directives  to  public  prosecutors with respect  to  the 
application of rules  of'law that  are  in force,  whether 
these  come  under national  or international laws.  The 
application by  the  courts  of Community  law  - and,  in 
particular,  of  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty that  created 
the  European Economic  Community,  which  has  been in force 
for nearly eight years  - would  not  appear,  under  the 
circumstances,  to necessitate  any  special intervention; 
c)  Article  177  of  the  Treaty setting up  the  European 
Economic  Community  expressly provides that when  any 
question  concerning the  interpretation of  the  Treaty  "is 
raised before  any  court  of  law  of  one  of the  Member 
States,  the  said court  may,  if it considers that  a  deci-
sion on  the  question is essential to  enable it to  render 
judgment,  request  the  Court  of Justice  to  give  a  ruling 
thereon. 
Where  any  such  question is raised in a  case  pending before 
a  domestic  court  of  a  Member  State,  against whose  deci-
sions  there is no  possibility of appeal  under  domestic 
law,  the  said court is bound  to  refer the  matter  to  the 
- 59  -Court  of Justice." (Journal Officiel,  Assemblee  Nationale, 
Debats,  5  February  196&} 
b)  Netherlands 
1.  Discussion in the  Second  Chamber  on  the  agreement 
reached in Luxembourg 
On  1  February,  Foreign Minister Luns  report  to  the  Second 
Chamber  of  the  States-General  on  the  negotiations in 
Luxembourg  at  the  second  extraordinary meeting  of  the 
Council  of Ministers.  He  stated that it was  largely as 
a  result  of  the  close  co-operation between  the  Dutch  and 
German  delegations  that  an  acceptable  agreement  had 
finally been possible.  The  discussions  on  the  majority 
vote  decisions were  concluded  on  the  basis  of  a  joint 
Belgian-Dutch  document  which recorded  the  disagreement 
that still existed  between  the  Five  and  France.  This 
meant  in fact  that  the  French Delegation had  made  a  re-
servation which  was  not  accepted  by  the  other members. 
"For  a  debate  on  such  an  important  point,  this was  not  a 
particularly desirable  outcome;  it is,  none  the  less, 
acceptable  to  the  Dutch  Government,  firstly because it is 
not  certain that  France  will  take  advantage  of this re-
servation -if she  did  so,  the  Five  others would  immedi-
ately counter with  a  "non  possumus''  - and  secondly, 
because  the  Treaty has  been  preserved intact." 
Commenting  on  the  text  adopted in Luxembourg,  Mr.  Luns 
stressed  that  the  disagreemen~ that  had  emerged  between 
the  Five  and  France  had  not  prevented  the  resumption  of 
the  activities of  the  Communi~y according  to  the  normal 
procedure.  Could it be  deduced  from  this that,  in the 
view  of  the  Six  Governments,  work  could  be  carried  on 
normally if a  disagreement  arose  about  the  application of 
the  majority rule?  Indeed not.  ~he  only  possible inter-
pretation in keeping with  the  original  text  of  the  docu-
ment  was  that in  such  a  case,  the  majority rule  would 
have  to  be  applied. 
The  memorandum  on relations between  the  Commission  and 
the  Council  was  considerably modified  and  reduced  to 
seven  points.  The  right  of initiative  of  the  Commission 
had  remained unimpaired.  The  two  institutions would  co-
operate  more  closely in the  sphere  of  Community  informa-
tion.  For Mr.  Luns  this meant  that  information  on  the 
- 60  -work  of the  Commission itself would  remain  the  latter's 
prerogative.  The  French Delegation withdrew its draft 
timetable  concerning the  work  of  the  CoYncil. 
The  speaker called upon  the  Chamber  to ratify the  treaty 
on  the  merger  as  soon  as  possible  and  the  Dutch Govern-
ment  undertook not  to  submit  the  instruments  of ratifica-
tion until an  arrangement  had  been  found  that was  accept-
able  to  the  Six  countries  on  the  membership  of  the  new 
Commission,  its powers,  the  allocation of its duties,  a 
possible  rota system  and  all the  other questions  arising 
in this  connexion. 
Mr.  Luns  assessed  the  present  situation as  follows:  the 
satisfaction engendered  by  the  Community's  return to 
normal  operation was  to  some  extent vitiated by  the 
prospect  of difficult discussions,  especially  on  the 
problem of financing agriculture,  the Kennedy  Round,  the 
membership  of the  new  Commission  and  the  allocation of 
its duties.  The  differences  on  points  of principle be-
tween  the  Five  and  France  had  not  been  overcome;  hence it 
was  possible  that  the  Community  would  again be  faced  with 
a  crisis. 
Mr.  Blaisse,  spokesman for  the  Catholic  People's Party 
(KVP),  drew  attention to  the  changing pattern of rela-
tions between East  and  West;  gradually  a  new  political 
climate  was  emerging,  which  would  "enable  us  to  abandon 
our defensive  position,  which was  fully understandable  at 
one  time,  in the  conflict between East  and  West  and  to 
seek  new  forms  of co-operation founded  on  peaceful  con-
frontation.  The  reorientation of Western policy could 
also  be  the  occasion for  a  revision of  our attitude  to 
Germany.  To  improve  the  agreement  between East  and  West, 
solutions  ought  to  be  found  that fit into  the  general 
context  of  current  European  problems." 
The  Catholic  People's Party did not  welcome  the  outcome 
of the  Luxembourg meeting without  reservation.  The 
Government  had  verged  on  the  limits of the  acceptable. 
The  fact  that  the  Five  countries had  presented  a  common 
front  was  a  positive factor.  But  on  the  question of 
majority decisions,  the  crisis continued  and  the  speaker 
hoped  that if it proved  impossible  to  reach unanimous 
agreement,  France  would  come  round  to  the  majority deci-
sion of the  Five.  The  Catholic  People's Party pointed 
out  that  the  Treaty had  to  be  enacted in a  balanced 
manner  and  stressed  the  outward-looking character of the 
Community.  The  speaker felt  that  the  United Kingdom 
should not  accede  to  the  Community  before  the  precise 
implications  and  practical  operation of the  Luxembourg 
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the  United Kingdom in turn entered  the  same  reservation 
as  France. 
lastly,  the  Group  considered that  the  budgetary  powers  of 
the  European Parliament  should  be  increased  as  soon  as 
the  Community  attracted independent  revenues  and  that 
there  should  be  no  slackening in the  efforts  to  associate 
the  European  Parliament  in one  way  or  another in the 
legislative  process. 
Speaking for  the  Socialist  Group,  Mr.  Patijn said  that 
the  crisis had  not  been  resolved but  simply  shelved.  The 
general impression was  that  the  EEC  had  not  succumbed  but 
it was  going  ahead  on  the  precarious basis  of  a  disagree-
ment  which  was  in the  nature  of  a  time  bomb. 
Mr.  Patijn,  unlike  Mr.  Blaisse,  felt  that  the  United King-
dom's  accession would  be  highly advisable.  It would  be 
better to  tackle all the  problems  together while  taking 
care  not  to  impair  the  structure  of the  Treaty. 
Mr.  Bos  (Historic Christian Union)  regretted that  the 
Five  had  agreed  to  the  progress  of  the  EEC  being held up 
by  France.  This  was  in fact  what  followed  from  the  fact 
that  no  satisfactory solution had  been  found  to  the  cri-
sis.  The  speaker felt,  however,  that  the  result  achieved 
was  better than  any  other  solution. 
Speaking for  the  People's Party for  Freedom and  Democracy, 
Mr.  Berkhouwer  trusted  that  the  Five  would  take  up  again 
the  initiative in building Europe  and  not  be  content 
simply  to  view  French attitudes negatively.  With  regard 
to  the  United Kingdom,  he  regretted that its accession 
was  more  often than  not  regarded  as  a  way  out  of  a  dilem-
ma.  It was  a  rr~stake  to  think  solely in Continental 
terms.  The  Six had  to  continue  their efforts to  achieve 
a  rapprochement  not  only with  the  United Kingdom but  also 
with  the  other EFTA  countries,  because  the  internal  cus-
toms  duties would  soon be  removed  within both associa-
tions.  The  speaker was  concerned  at  the  lack of  dynamic 
ideas  among  the  Five  and  at  the  protectionist  trends 
manifest  among  the  Six. 
Miss Rutgers,  spokesman  for  the  Anti-Revolutionary Party, 
considered that  the  Luxembourg  statement  was  not  a  legal 
document;  yet  although it did  not  have  the  force  of  law 
it had  a  political  significance which  would  depend  mainly 
on·the  attitude  taken by  the  Five  during  subsequent  nego-
tiations. 
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Mr.  Luns  endorsed  the  op1n1on  of Miss Rutgers,  stating 
that  the  Luxembourg  document  was  a  "sort  of  aide-memoire 
of  the  views  of the  Member  States  on  the  policy they 
intended  to  pursue  when  decisions had  to  be  taken on  the 
Council.  Five  of the  Six  countries had  similar ideas;  as 
to  the  sixth, it could not necessarily bring any  influence 
to  bear  on  the  way  the  others acted in any  given set of 
circumstances."  The  Commission  could  consult  the  European 
Parliament at  any  time.  The  talks with the  Commission  on 
the  remaining  seven points  of the  French memorandum  would 
take  their normal  course  according to  the  procedure  laid 
down  in Article  162  of  the .EEC  Treaty,  so  that  the  Coun-· 
cil could  decide its attitude  by  a  simple  majority. 
As  to  the  desirability of  any  short-term initiative con-
cerning the  United Kingdom,  Mr.  Luns  was  less reserved in 
his attitude  than Mr.  Blaisse.  Care  had  to  be  taken, 
however,  that  the  discussions  that were  held did not 
impair  the  institutional structure  of the  present  EEC 
Treaty.  The  speaker  pointed  out,  moreover,  that  the 
present British Government  did not  regard  the  institution-
al  structure  of the  Communities  as  a  major  obstacle. 
Mr.  Luns  stated that  the  Dutch  Government  would  support 
the  retention of Mr.  Mansholt  as Vice-President  of  the 
new  Commission.  Its attitude  to  the  retention of Mr. 
Hallstein as President  of this Commission would  depend 
primarily  on  the  attitude  taken by  the  Federal  German 
Government.  (Debates in the  Second  Chamber  on  1  February 
1966,  session  1965-66) 
2.  Procedure  for ratifying the  merger  treaty 
In its interim report  on  the bill approving the  treaty 
merging  the  Executives,  the  Foreign Affairs Budget  Com-
mittee  stated  (a)  that if the  submission of the  instru-
ments  of ratification were  delayed until certain arrange-
ments  had  been made  and  accepted  by  the  Six  countries 
this would  raise  a  problem of constitutional as well  as 
political import  and  (b)  that  the  statements made  on  this 
subject by  the  Government  implied that  the  States-General 
were  asked  to  give  not  final but  only  conditional  approval 
to  the  treaty. 
The  Committee  had  so  far not  shown itself at all ready  to 
leave  to  the  discretion of  the  Government  the  timing of 
the  ratification of the  treaty;  several  means  had  been 
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envisaged  "to  ensure  that  the  Parliament might,  as  was 
proper,  bring its influence  to  bear  on  the  matter."  Hence, 
the  date  on  which  the  ratification act  came  into force 
would  be  decided  along legislative lines.  The  Chamber 
could,  at  several  stages,  adjourn  the  debate,  especially 
if it deferred  the  submission of  the  final  report  of  the 
Committee  or if it postponed  sine  die  the  final vote  on 
the  bill.  The  Chamber  could  also  move  a  motion requiring 
the  Government  to  notify  the  Chamber  in good  time  of its 
intention to  submit  the  instruments  of ratification. 
The  Chamber  decided  to  make  a  final  decision  on  the  bill, 
subject  to its agreement  on  the  membership  of  the  new 
Commission  (i.e.  on its agreement  on  the  appointment  of 
all  14  members);  several  members  then  said  that  they 
might  be  willing to  withdraw this reservation if they  were 
convinced  that  the  European Parliament  would  exercise 
adequate  supervision over  the  constitution of  the  Commis-
sion.  They  thought  that  the  Community  parliamentary  body 
was  better able  to  judge  of this political matter  than 
was  a  national parliament.  As  regards  the  terms  govern-
ing the  intervention of  the  European Parliament,  one 
possibility might  be  talks  between representatives  of the 
governments  and  the  President  of  the  Parliament  and  the 
Chairman  of  the  political  Groups  in that Assembly. 
(Session  1965-66  - 8380  (R.506) 
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